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Abstract  
To what extent is Greece’s current economic crisis the result of monetary policy 
misalignment between the European Central Bank and Greece? We use a risk 
 adjusted Taylor Rule to examine Greece’s monetary policy from 1993 to the present. 
We argue that the monetary policy of the Bank of Greece satisfies several criteria 
for a good monetary policy. The monetary policy of the ECB, on the other hand, 
exhibits characteristics that suggest it had a destabilizing effect on the economy 
of Greece. That is, whereas the ECB could have balanced excessive fiscal stimulus 
with a contractionary monetary policy, the ECB’s actual expansionary monetary 
policy may have reinforced the fiscal stimulus and led to further destabilization.
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1. Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in Greece has posed major problems in financial markets 
and has nearly caused the breakup of the euro. It would be worthwhile to study the 
causes of the crisis. Much of the media coverage of the economic crisis in Greece 
has emphasized unsustainable fiscal policies as a leading cause. Popular, moralizing 
narratives describe a profligate Greece using deficit spending for unsustainable social 
programs; these popular narratives have contributed to the reluctance of stable coun-
tries like Germany to provide bailouts. Austerity measures and fiscal consolidation in 
Greece are widely prescribed as a necessary remedy.
 Fiscal policy tells only part of the story of the crisis, however. In adopting the 
euro and joining the European Economic and Monetary Union, Greece ceded control 
of its monetary policy to the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, which sets euro 
interest rates based on the conditions in the entire eurozone. Given the importance 
of monetary policy, it is important to determine what kind of monetary policies were 
in place under the separate regimes of the Bank of Greece and the European Central 
Bank. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998, hereafter CGG) have developed a suitable 
method, based on Taylor’s (1993) research in monetary policy rules, for character-
izing monetary policy by its response to macroeconomic conditions such as inflation 
and output gaps. The response of a policy rule to macroeconomic conditions allows 
researchers to draw inferences about that policy’s effectiveness. Once a central bank’s 
policy rule is estimated, it can be used to simulate how it would have reacted under 
hypothetical macroeconomic conditions. Taking the estimated policy rule of a highly 
respected central bank, like the Bundesbank or the Federal Reserve, one can construct 
a counter-factual monetary policy to use as a benchmark to which other policies can 
be compared.
 We propose to analyze the monetary policies of the Bank of Greece and the European 
Central Bank. Based on estimated policy rules, we shall determine whether each policy 
would be expected to have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the macroeconomy 
of Greece. We shall then evaluate each central bank’s realized policy in light of a hy-
pothetical policy constructed from the Bundesbank’s and Federal Reserve’s estimated 
policy rules. Based on these analyses, we hope to discover whether monetary policy 
contributed to Greece’s current economic crisis, and to gain a better understanding of 
how Greece has been affected by adopting the euro as its currency.
 In the following section we shall introduce the economic background of Greece. 
Greece has experienced a succession of very different monetary regimes, and knowl-
edge of these special circumstances will help with interpreting the analysis. In the 
third section we present our hypothesis. In the fourth section we describe our analyti-
cal method. In the fifth section we report the results of our Taylor rule analysis using 
the Bundesbank as a proxy for a conservative central bank. As a robustness check, 
we augment our analysis by investigating whether differences in expropriation risk 
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between Germany and Greece may have biased our results. The sixth section offers a 
further robustness check, where we conduct a second counterfactual analysis using the 
Federal Reserve’s, rather than the Bundesbank’s, estimated Taylor rule. In the seventh 
section we discuss our results. The eighth section is our conclusion.
2. The Economic Situation of Greece
2.1 Expansion of Social Programs: 1974-1993
In the year 1974, momentous changes swept through Greece: the authoritarian regime 
collapsed, King Constantine II was deposed, and a new democratic government was 
established. Prior to this period, Greece had attained low inflation and a credible peg 
to the United States dollar. However, inflation rose with the elimination of the Bretton 
Woods constraints; the first oil shock; and internal populist pressure for income redistri-
bution, full-employment policies, and expansionary fiscal policy (Alogoskoufis 1995). 
 Inflation, which averaged 3.8% annually from 1954 to 1973, rose to an average 
of 18.1% from 1974 to 1993. Output growth, which averaged 7.1% from 1954 to 
1973 (the so-called “Greek Miracle”), fell to an average of 2.1% from 1974 to 1993. 
The result was a lengthy period of stagflation; several industries were nationalized, 
calling into question the security of property rights in Greece (Alogoskoufis 1995). 
The Bretton Woods peg gave way to a “crawling” peg, with several devaluations and 
failed attempts to regain credibility (Panagiotidis and Triampella 2005). Government 
fiscal deficits, intended to accomplish income redistribution, were financed by debt 
and seigniorage (Lazaretou 2003).
Figure 1. Prior to the sovereign debt crisis, real GDP growth in Greece outpaced that in the other 
European OECD member countries.
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2.2 Maastricht Treaty and Convergence: 1993-2001
In 1993, Greece signed the Maastricht Treaty, pledging to converge economically 
with her future currency partners. To attain convergence, Greece set out to tighten 
fiscal policy and curb inflation according to a plan approved in March of 1993; the 
government had already abandoned this plan before the end of the year, and approved 
a more gradual plan in June of 1994. 
 Parallel to fiscal reform, Greece also conducted monetary reform. Inflation fell from 
23.3% in October of 1990 to 3.9% in December of 2000. As part of the convergence 
program, the Bank of Greece engaged in a foreign-exchange policy known as the “hard 
drachma” policy. The Bank of Greece announced an official exchange rate target, 
which would serve as an important benchmark in Greece’s monetary policy. Indeed, 
Arghyrou (2009) uses Taylor rules to find that Greek interest rates in the 1990’s were 
statistically significantly correlated with domestic inflation, but even more significantly 
with foreign interest rates, namely those of the Bundesbank, and later the ECB. Fur-
thermore, he determines that foreign interest rates were more important during normal 
demand conditions, with domestic inflation being more important during overheating 
demand conditions.
 Tavlas and Papaspyrou (n.d.) note that during the first phase of the convergence 
program, 1995-1997, inflation halved and GDP growth accelerated. They attribute both 
of these outcomes to the high credibility of the Bank of Greece’s foreign-exchange 
peg. Previously, the Bank of Greece had not announced specific exchange-rate targets; 
the drachma had experienced decades of devaluation since the collapse of Bretton 
Woods. Nevertheless, the drachma increased in value with respect to PPP and be-
came increasingly overvalued until an exchange-rate crisis in 1998. Even after the 
1995 announcement of a fixed exchange-rate target, an inflation differential persisted 
between Greece and the rest of Europe. Arghyrou (2009) uses an Uncovered Interest 
Parity model to estimate that markets demanded a 9-11% risk premium on drachma 
denominated assets from 1990 through 2000. Tavlas and Papaspyrou (n.d.) identify 
several obstacles to the strong drachma policy. High interest rates, necessary to suppress 
domestic inflation, led to capital inflow, which was costly to sterilize for the Bank of 
Greece. Furthermore, a current account deficit widened as the drachma became in-
creasingly overvalued. These factors, combined with international financial turbulence 
following the devaluation of the Thai Bhat in July 1997, strained the Greek money 
market, ultimately leading to the collapse of the drachma’s peg in March 1998. The 
Bank of Greece devalued the drachma by 12% and entered into the wide-fluctuation 
band Exchange Rate Mechanism. In the years that followed, Greece moved closer to 
the Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria, and was permitted to join the euro.
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Figure 2. Inflation in Greece cooled from 23.3% in October, 1990 to 3.9% when Greece joined the 
euro in December, 2000. Despite progress toward convergence in the 1990s, inflation in Greece did 
not drop below the Eurozone average until July of 2011. From 2001 through 2008, average CPI 
inflation was 3.5% in Greece and 2.4% in the Eurozone.
Greek monetary policy in the convergence era, which spans from 1993 through 2000, 
is importantly characterized by the external constraints of foreign-exchange targets, 
which historically have been important in Greece; during the Greek Miracle period, 
1954-1973, the Bretton Woods system had provided such a constraint.
2.3 Accession, Growth, and Crisis: 2002-2012
Greece formally adopted the euro on January 1, 2001. Drachma overnight interest rates, 
continuing their downward trend from the 1990s, had fallen to 6.16% in December, 
2000; and when Greece adopted the euro in January, euro overnight rates were at 
4.76%, then fell over the course of several years, reaching a low of about 1.97% in 
November, 2003, then rising slowly to a high of 4.3% in August, 2008, as the financial 
crisis was breaking (see Figure 3). Greece, both in money markets and in the sale of 
government debt, enjoyed considerably lower interest rates than it experienced under 
the drachma regime. A Taylor-rule counterfactual analysis by Arghyrou (2009) sug-
gests that, during this period, the ECB set interest rates lower than the Bank of Greece 
would have. Arghyrou argues that such lower interest rates could potentially cause 
inflation in Greece, resulting in overheated demand, real-exchange-rate overvaluation, 
and current account deficits. Furthermore, he argues, Greece’s accession to the euro 
eliminated the risk premium of drachma-denominated assets. The elimination of this 
risk premium would increase inflation and current-account deficits in the short term, 
but the inflation and deficits would subside in the medium-term. 
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 Nevertheless, government final consumption expenditure decreased as a share of 
GDP immediately after accession, and only gradually increased before rising sharply 
to a peak in 2009:Q4. It is perhaps interesting that the government share of GDP in 
Greece did not exceed that of the weighted average of all European OECD countries 
until 2009:Q4. Furthermore, Greece experienced strong economic growth after her 
accession to the euro.
Figure 3. Prior to adopting the euro in January of 2001, the Bank of Greece determined Greece’s 
monetary policy.
It is worth noting, however, that the OECD’s statistics for Greece are taken from the 
National Statistical Service of Greece, which the European Commission criticized in a 
January 2010 report, describing actual instances of misrepresented data, especially in 
GDP and budget deficit as a percent of GDP. Indeed, the National Statistical Service of 
Greece revised GDP figures upward by as much as 25% in some quarters, purportedly 
by including the black-market and illegal-goods sectors, with the apparent purpose 
being to keep its budget deficit to GDP ratio within specific bounds (International 
Herald Tribune 2006, Economist 2011b).
 Problems began to emerge in Greece during the late 2000’s financial crisis and 
economic downturn, with the sovereign debt crisis beginning to unfold in 2010. 
Specifically, the government of Greece had accumulated large debts, saw declining 
tax revenues as a result of the recession, faced unsustainable interest rates in bond 
markets, and was on the brink of insolvency. A Greek government default would be 
catastrophic for Greece, and for not only the banks in Greece, but also those in the 
rest of Europe. So far, European leaders have addressed this situation through a com-
bination of additional bailout loans, debt renegotiations and “haircuts,” and austerity 
measures for the Greek government. The process of dealing with Greece has been 
particularly difficult because of the conflicting viewpoints: some, especially in fiscally 
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strong countries like Germany, hold that Greece was a profligate country and deserves 
to default; others support bailouts because of the enormous risks facing the European 
financial system as a whole, even in sound countries like France and Germany; and 
still others would support bailouts but worry about the problem of moral hazard. The 
Greek debt crisis has even, at times, called into question the very survival of the euro 
as a common currency (Economist 2011a).
3. To What Extent was Monetary Policy a Factor?
The broad consensus is that the Greek sovereign debt crisis was caused by poor fiscal 
policies, with the Greek government running budget deficits to finance social programs. 
In the past, Greece was accustomed to doing this without dire consequence because 
it could escape its debts through inflationary finance and currency devaluation; that 
is, proper monetary policy offered a counterbalance to fiscal policy. Today, however, 
Greece cannot devalue its currency unilaterally because it shares a currency with 
countries like Germany. To what extent has Greece’s lack of a nationally appropriate 
monetary policy exacerbated, or even caused, its current crisis?
 Monetary policy in Greece has been exceptional in the past nineteen years. Monetary 
policy, as practiced by the Federal Reserve, for example, is often intended to stabilize 
inflation at a low level, and to mitigate the business cycle. From 1993 until 2000, 
however, Greece’s monetary policy was focused not only on inflation and stabilizing 
output, but also on maintaining a foreign-exchange peg (under tremendous speculative 
pressure) and converging to the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty with respect to 
several indicators, including inflation. From 2001 to the present, Greece’s monetary 
policy has been determined not by a Bank of Greece in Athens setting interest rates 
with only the Greek economy in mind, but by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt 
setting interest rates for the entire eurozone. 
 Furthermore, if the central bank restricts credit, interest rates will rise, businesses 
will be less likely to invest, and economic output will fall. On the other hand, when 
central banks undertake monetary expansion to depress interest rates, the economy 
will enjoy a short-term boom, but the risk develops that credit will be allocated into 
speculative bubbles that will burst, driving down asset prices and leading to a period 
of deflation and economic contraction. Central banks are thus generally encouraged 
to set interest rates between these two hazards. Taylor’s (1993) policy rule is meant 
to provide a middle ground for central bankers. 
 It would be interesting, given the potential for monetary policy to affect the mac-
roeconomy, to assess what kind of monetary policy was in use in Greece during the 
period in question. CGG (2000) have provided a method for estimating Taylor-rule 
coefficients to describe a monetary policy and characterize the general behavior of 
a central bank. Furthermore, they use these coefficients to perform counter-factual 
analyses that suggest what one central bank might have done given certain economic 
conditions. Specifically, we can determine whether a central bank followed the Taylor 
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principle, i.e., whether the central bank raised real interest rates in response to rising 
inflation, and vice-versa.
 We intend to use CGG’s methods to evaluate the monetary policy in Greece during 
the periods 1993:1-2000:12 and 2001:01-2010:12. If we view the Bundesbank as a 
highly respected central bank, we can see whether the Bank of Greece set rates higher 
or lower than this benchmark. Furthermore, we can carry these projections forward 
and evaluate whether the rates set by the European Central Bank made sense given 
economic conditions in Greece. Finally, we can estimate Taylor-rule coefficients to 
characterize the general behavior of the Bundesbank and the Bank of Greece. We can 
also estimate coefficients for the European Central Bank, but based on Greece’s eco-
nomic data, so that we can analyze the Taylor rule that was de facto in use in Greece 
from 2001 to 2010. Using the Taylor rule coefficients, we can ascertain whether the 
banks responded to inflation and output gaps in the manner we expect.
 Specifically, we expect the following for a stabilizing policy rule: The inflation 
coefficient β should be greater than one, and the output-gap coefficient γ should be 
greater than 0. In both cases, the rule applies negative feedback to macroeconomic 
forces. This policy stimulates the economy with lower interest rates in response to 
disinflation and decreased output, and dampens an “overheated” economy with higher 
interest rates in response to inflation and increased output. Such a rule dampens devia-
tions from the target path of prices and RGDP. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) run 
a simulation to show that a policy rule with β < 1 can cause bursts of inflation even 
without fundamental shocks to the economy, whereas policy rules with β > 1 do not 
allow such outbursts.
4. Method
4.1 Estimating the Taylor Coefficients
In this section we derive and explain CGG’s (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1998) Taylor 
rule. The equation takes the basic form:
where
  is the implied nominal interest rate at time t
  is the long-run equilibrium nominal interest rate
  is the inflation reaction coefficient
   is the expectations operator
  is the inflation n periods from time t
  is the information set available to policymakers at time t
  is the target rate of inflation
  is the output-gap reaction coefficient
 is  the real national output at time t
 is  the potential output of the economy at time t
 
(1)
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It is assumed that the long-run equilibrium interest rate rr* follows the long-run neu-
trality of money hypothesis; as such, it is determined by non-monetary factors and 
can thus be treated as an exogenous constant. If rr* is known, then equation 1 can be 
rewritten to specify to specify a target real rate,                                      
Equation 2 demonstrates the Taylor Principle: if β < 1, the real interest rate will 
 decrease as inflation increases. Conversely, if β > 1, the real rate will increase as 
inflation increases. 
 Interest rates are seldom adjusted instantaneously. Therefore, to allow for “interest 
rate smoothing,” CGG model the interest rate as an AR(1) process as in:
where rt is the actual nominal interest rate at time t,                  is the degree of interest 
rate smoothing, and vt is an i.i.d. error term representing a random disturbance. 
 Substituting equation (1) into equation (3) and collapsing the expectations opera-
tors, we obtain
where                                                         and the error term      is defined as 
 Importantly,     , is a linear combination of forecast errors
and a random disturbance vt, and is assumed to be i.i.d. (CGG 1998). The coefficients of 
equation (4) can be estimated by generalized method of moments estimation (GMM).
4.2 Applying Germany’s Rule to Greece: The Counter-Factual Analysis
While the Bank of Greece struggled for political independence and credibility during the 
periods we examine, the German Bundesbank has enjoyed considerable  independence 
and high credibility. Therefore, we use the Bundesbank’s Taylor-rule coefficients as an 
example of a “good” policy-reaction function. Using the  Bundesbank’s coefficients and 
Greece’s economic conditions, one may form a conjecture about the monetary policy 
that would have existed in Greece had the governors of the Bundesbank  continued 
to make decisions as they would for Germany, but instead considering economic 
 conditions in Greece. We compare these conjectural interest rates to the actual  interest 
rates of the Bank of Greece (until December of 2000) and of the European Central 
Bank (from 2001 forward). This analysis aims to provide some basis of a “good” 
policy from which to discern whether the Bank of Greece acted wisely in managing the 
 affairs of its own country, and whether the European Central Bank was appropriately 
responding to conditions in Greece.
(2)
(3)
(4)
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(5)
 By calculating the average real interest rate in Germany, we obtain        , denoting 
Germany as “de” for convenience. By estimating equation 4 using data from Germany 
and performing the appropriate arithmetic, we obtain the coefficient vector {α
de
, β
de
, 
γ
de
, ρ
de
}.
 Instead of using Germany’s average real interest rate            to estimate a conjectural 
monetary policy for Greece, we use the average real interest rate for Greece,        , be-
cause the factors that determine the long-run equilibrium real interest rate are considered 
to be exogenous to monetary policy. Thus,          is exogenous to the Bundesbank, just 
as           is exogenous to the Bank of Greece; each central bank takes this as a datum. 
We calculate the constant term for the Bundesbank’s reaction function given Greece’s 
long-run real interest rate:
 This term             will be used in place of a
de
 for the counter-factual analysis be-
cause              properly accounts for the target rate of inflation, π*, which is endogenous 
to the Bundesbank’s monetary policy, and        (estimated as        ), which we assume 
is exogenous to monetary policy in general. Therefore, in our counter-factual analysis, 
the implied interest rate for Greece given the Bundesbank’s Taylor-rule coefficients, 
,           , is given by a modification of equation 4:
 The counter-factual rate depends upon the interest rate in the previous period, rt-1. 
The counter-factual rate for the initial period was estimated using (5) without the in-
ertial lag term. Because the coefficients were estimated using expectations of forward 
looking data, we estimate predicted values for future CPI inflation and the output gap 
using the variables from the instrument set. 
4.3 Data Selection
We use the OECD’s consumer price index (percent change over previous year) to 
measure inflation, and the OECD’s index of industrial production, specifically all 
 industry, as a proxy for output. The industrial production index was processed through 
a Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 129,600) to de-trend the data; we divided the  difference 
between the realized values and the smoothed values by the smoothed values and 
 multiplied this ratio by 100 to obtain a percentage output gap. We use overnight 
interbank interest rates to estimate Taylor rules for the Bundesbank and the Bank of 
Greece. CPI and industrial production data for “Germany” refer to West Germany 
prior to 1991 and refer to unified Germany from 1991 to the present.
 Following CGG, we select instruments that would be of use to monetary policy 
makers in forecasting future inflation and output gaps: the spread between long term 
and short term interest rates, the producer price index, the growth rate of the M2 money 
stock, as well as lagged values of the output gaps and inflation. 
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 Long term and short term rates for Germany and the euro area are taken from the 
OECD. The government of Greece did not regularly issue fixed-income securities 
until 1997, so we estimate Greek sovereign debt yields from long-term and short-term 
corporate bond yields obtained from the Bank of Greece. The producer price index 
is the Domestic Producer Price Index for Manufacturing, obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Economic Database (FRED). M2 growth for Greece is taken from the Bank of 
Greece, from FRED for Germany, and from the ECB for the euro. The Deutchmark-US 
dollar exchange rate is used for Germany, following CGG (1998), and was obtained 
from the OECD.
 The Bundesbank’s coefficients were estimated using data from January 1980 to 
December 1998. The Bank of Greece’s coefficients were estimated using data from 
January 1993 to December 2000. The ECB’s coefficients were estimated using data 
from January 2001 to December 2010.
 To estimate the risk-premium, we use the PRS Group’s “Investment Portfolio” 
risk factor, which specifically accounts for expropriation risk/contract viability, 
 profits  repatriation, and payment delays. It should be interesting to note that Greece 
and  Germany have similar risk indices for the period under consideration (see Figure 
5). We also use overnight interest rates from the OECD database. To represent the 
 European Central Bank’s monetary policy, we use the Euro OverNight Index Average, 
or EONIA, which is an average of all euro-denominated overnight money-market rates 
in Europe.
 Important to our econometric analysis is the assumption of stationarity of nominal 
interest rates, CPI inflation, and the output gap. The intuition provided by economic 
theory is that these series should be stationary: output gaps should be stationary if 
economic output tends towards its potential level, monetary authorities striving for 
price stability generally keep inflation within certain bounds, and real money market 
interest rates are seen as varying about a long-run mean value that reflects the time 
value of money and the fundamental need for liquidity in markets. Taking into account 
the low power of the Dickey-Fuller test to reject nonstationarity, especially in small 
samples, we test for stationarity over the entire observed values for our data, and are 
able to reject a unit root at 0.1 p-value for the series we use, allowing for drift1. 
5. Results
5.1 Analyzing Taylor-Rule Coefficients
First we estimate Taylor-rule coefficients for the Bundesbank and the Bank of Greece 
using each bank’s domestic data. We also estimate Taylor-rule coefficients for the 
1. We reject the null of a unit root using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with one lag and a trend. 
Six lags were required for the EONIA series.
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European Central Bank, but with inflation and output-gap data taken from Greece 
after its accession to the eurozone. From these estimated coefficients we can infer the 
character of each policy. The results appear in Table 1. Each policy rule is specified 
with three lags of the overnight interest rate to eliminate autocorrelation in the residu-
als2. In no cases are we required to reject the model’s overidentification restrictions3.
Table 1. Interest Rate Policy Rules
 Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. These coefficients were estimated using the 
generalized method of moments with a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent weighting 
matrix using the Newey-West optimal lag-selection algorithm. For the BOG’s policy rule, using one 
lag of the interest rate in the Taylor rule was sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation in the residuals. For 
the Bundesbank and ECB, three lags of the interest rate were required to eliminate  autocorrelation.
 For the Bundesbank (Table 1, row 1), which serves as an example of how a highly 
respected central bank acts, we estimate Taylor-rule coefficients for the period 1980:1-
1998:12. The variables β, γ, and ρ are all significant at the p = 0.01 level. The inflation 
response coefficient β takes a value greater than one, implying that the Bundesbank’s 
policy rule satisfies the “Taylor principle” criterion. We can additionally reject the 
hypothesis that β < 1 at p=0.04 significance. The output-gap coefficient γ has a positive 
sign, which we expected of a stabilizing response. The smoothing coefficient ρ takes 
a value close to its upper bound of 1, which implies that the Bundesbank adjusted 
interest rates very gradually. 
 For the Bank of Greece (Table 1, row 2), coefficients were obtained based on 
data from January 1993 to December 2000, because the period prior to 1993 was 
characterized by a very different monetary policy regime with far less central-bank 
independence and far greater government dependence on seigniorage revenue. We 
2. Using a Ljung-Box Q test with 40 lags, we did not find evidence of autocorrelation. Under the 
null hypothesis, the error term is independently distributed, with the lowest p-value we observe 
being 0.4321.
3. We do not reject the null hypothesis of Hansen’s J-test, with the lowest p-value observed being 
0.9639.
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replace the observed overnight rates for May 1994 and October-November 1997 with 
interpolated values to exclude the effects of the two speculative attacks on the Greek 
money market (see Figure 3); in these attacks, global financial forces overpowered the 
Bank of Greece, and so the interest rates during these periods should not be considered 
representative of the Bank’s policy rule. 
 The inflation coefficient β is found to be statistically significant, and takes a value 
greater than 1, implying that the Bank of Greece’s policy rule, like the Bundesbank’s, 
satisfies the Taylor principle. We can additionally reject the hypothesis that β<1 with 
much higher than p=0.001 significance. The sign on the output-gap coefficient is 
negative. This is the opposite of what we would expect of a stabilizing policy rule. 
The implications of this are not entirely clear. The lag coefficient ρ is estimated at 0.84 
(s.e. 0.01). This value is less than the estimate for Germany. The Bank of Greece’s 
lower observed value of ρ for the period 1993-2000 is likely explained by the high 
interest-rate volatility of 1993 and 1994. 
 The observed value of Greece’s          is somewhat high (Table 1, row 2) in comparison 
to Germany’s (row 1S), but this is likely a consequence of the time period selection. 
Because the Bank of Greece was bringing about disinflation prior to adopting the euro, 
the average real interest rate observed during this period is likely an  overestimate of 
the true, long-run equilibrium real interest rate (CGG 2000). CGG’s method assumes 
that rr*, the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, can be estimated by taking the 
 average real interest rate over the period in question. Because our observations include 
a period of disinflation, real interest rates were unusually high and are likely a biased 
estimate of the true long-run equilibrium real interest rate.
 Compare this to the European Central Bank period (Table 1, rows 3 and 4). To 
allow for the possibility that the Greek sovereign debt crisis has forced the ECB 
to adopt unconventional monetary policies, we examine two periods, a longer one 
 covering January 2001 through December 2010, and a shorter one covering January 
2001 through December 2007. Both calculations find statistically significant and 
 positive γ coefficients on the output gap, which CGG would characterize as  stabilizing. 
Yet both also reject the hypothesis β>1 at the p=0.05 significance level, which CGG 
would characterize as destabilizing. The smoothing coefficient ρ is comparable to the 
Bundesbank’s value. Somewhat more problematic is that since Greece joined the euro, 
real interest rates have been, on average, negative.
5.2 Counter-Factual Analysis
In our counter-factual analysis, the Bundesbank’s Taylor-rule coefficients are used to 
generate a series of implied interest rates,         , based upon economic conditions in 
Greece. Figure 4 presents the counterfactual overnight interest rate for Greece, using 
the Bundesbank’s Taylor rule coefficients and Greece’s economic data. Also presented 
are two series of realized interest rates, one which represents the monetary policy of 
the Bank of Greece, and the other which represents that of the European Central Bank.
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Figure 4. Implied interest rates for Greece using Bundesbank Taylor rule coefficients. Observed rates 
for May 1994 and October-November 1997 were replaced with interpolated values.
Table 2. Counterfactual Analysis: Differences from Bundesbank Implied Target Rate
 Note: Data from May 1994, October-November 1997 foreign exchange crises were excluded.
diff* = (counterfactual rate) - (realized rate). Bank of Greece data are from 1993:1 to 2000:12, ECB 
data are from 2001:1 to 2010:12.
If the foreign exchange crises of May 1994 and October-November 1997 are excluded, 
one can observe by mere visual inspection that there was little difference between the 
Bank of Greece’s actual interest rates, and those calculated hypothetically from the 
Bundesbank’s policy rule. An appreciable difference emerges, however, after Greece’s 
transition to the euro, when the Bundesbank would have set rates much higher than 
the ECB actually did.
 Table 2 presents this inference numerically. Realized interest rates were subtracted 
from the counter-factual implied series (with the foreign exchange crises removed). 
The Bank of Greece set interest rates, on average, only 34 basis points below what 
was implied by the Bundesbank’s policy rule, adjusted for expropriation risk, and 
excluding the two foreign exchange crises. The European Central Bank, on the other 
hand, set rates an average of 7.67% below the Bundesbank’s hypothetical rate.
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5.3 Risk Adjustment
A counter-factual analysis could be biased if there exist differences in expropriation risk, 
which affects the risk premium demanded by lenders. Whereas Germany is perceived 
as a highly developed and stable economy, Greece has suffered from high inflation and 
a turbulent political climate. To account for this, we adjust the implied interest rate for 
Greece given the Bundesbank’s Taylor-rule coefficients,              , using:
where the index i denotes a given country, and the “return” refers to the overnight 
 interest rate. We denote the risk for country i at time t as φt,i; we denote the risk-free 
rate, or intercept term, as Rf, and the market risk premium as θ. Note that we use real 
interest rates in estimating the risk premium. This prevents differing inflation targets 
across countries from affecting measurements of the actual market risk premium, 
which would appear in real returns. In finding a risk-premium with which to adjust 
interest rates implied by the Bundesbank’s coefficients for the Greek economy, we 
combine two versions of equation 6, subtracting the equation for Germany from the 
equation for Greece:
The risk premium is exogenous to monetary policy and is best thought of as a 
 component of the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, rr* (it will be estimated from 
real interest rates). Therefore, the risk premium should be added to rr*, which does not 
appear directly in equation (5), but rather is a component of a = r* + βπ*, where rr* = 
r* - π*. Consequently, we include the risk premium by adding the difference in returns 
θ(φt,gr-φt,de) to α, so that α΄t = rr
*+ θ(φt,gr - φt,de )+ βπ
*. This value can be substituted in 
place of a non-risk-adjusted α to define a new risk-adjusted interest rate series,
From the “Investment Portfolio” cross-sectional time series from the PRS Group, we 
obtain a risk index for each country. The indices vary from 1 (riskiest) to 12 (safest). 
From the OECD’s database we construct a cross-sectional time series of interest rates 
and inflation rates, from which we obtain a cross-sectional time series of real interest 
rates.
 One important task is to determine which data to include. The objective of this 
 analysis is to determine a market risk premium. Some of the countries sampled 
 experienced hyperinflation at some point during the observation period. Credit 
markets experiencing hyperinflation are very different from those not experiencing 
hyperinflation. Specifically, we want to find a market risk premium for Greece, which 
has not experienced hyperinflation from 1993 to the present. Consequently, data from 
countries experiencing hyperinflation or countries with exceptionally high risk  levels 
were excluded so that this risk premium for Greece would be formed based on a like
(6)
(7)
(8)
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comparison. Specifically, all countries with a risk level more severe than 4 were 
excluded, as Greece’s worst risk level since 1993 was a 4, and markets riskier than 
this are probably heavily influenced by non-market forces (whereas the purpose of 
this test is to determine a market risk premium). We also excluded all countries with 
real interest rates less than -10%, as interest rates more negative than this are also not 
likely the result of market action.
Figure 5. Risk Indices for Greece and Germany.
Using a cross-sectional time-series regression, we estimate the risk coefficient to be 
-0.30, with a standard error of 0.055; therefore, a 1 point increase in the risk index 
decreases real interest rates by 0.3%. 
 The risk adjustment increases the Bundesbank’s counterfactual rate by an average 
of 17 basis points, although the risk-adjusted rate is lower than the unadjusted rate 
from April of 1998 through December of 2001. Although this gap does widen to a 
more substantial 60 basis points in June of 2010 (the last month for which data are 
available), the calculated impact of expropriation is modest during both the Bank of 
Greece’s and the ECB’s regimes. Table 3 demonstrates that the Bank of Greece still 
behaved much like the Bundesbank, whereas the ECB did not.
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Table 3. Counterfactual Analysis: Differences from Bundesbank Implied (Risk Ad-
justed) Target Rate
 Note: Data from May 1994, October-November 1997 foreign exchange crises were excluded. 
diff * is equal to the counterfactual rate less the realized rate.
6. Counterfactual Analysis Using Federal Reserve Coefficients
We expand our counterfactual analysis by using the Federal Reserve’s policy rule during 
the period 1982:10-1996:12, which was described by CGG (2000) as corresponding to 
the “stable” era of recent macroeconomic history. We use GMM estimation to obtain 
a policy rule for the Federal Reserve using data taken from the OECD: the monthly 
Federal Funds Rate, output gaps measured from an HP-detrended Industrial  Production 
Index, and the CPI. We use as instruments the spread between ten-year Treasury bonds 
and three-month Treasury notes as well as the year-over-year growth of the M2 money 
stock. We risk-adjust the data using the same PRS “portfolio risk” index. 
 We report the results of estimation in Table 44. We used the Federal Reserve’s 
 coefficients to generate a series of counterfactual interest rates. A comparison can be 
made visually in Figure 6, or quantitatively in Table 5. The Federal Reserve largely 
concurs with the Bundesbank. A large difference appears between the Federal Reserve’s 
implied rates and the ECB’s actual rates. We found that risk adjusting the Federal 
Reserve’s rates had negligible effects on the results.
Table 4. Federal Reserve Policy Rule
 Note: Federal Reserve data are from October 1982 to December 1996. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses.
4. As in our previous estimations, we specify a model with three lags of the interest rate to eliminate 
autocorrelation in the residual term, as determined by the Ljung-Box Q test. Hansen’s J-test does 
not lead us to reject the model’s overidentifying restrictions.
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Figure 6. Implied interest rate for Greece based on the Federal Reserve Taylor rule coefficients. 
Observed rates for May 1994 and October-November 1997 were replaced with interpolated values.
Table 5. Counterfactual Analysis: Differences from Federal Reserve Implied (Risk 
Adjusted) Target Rate
 Note: Data from May 1994, October-November 1997 foreign exchange crises were replaced 
with interpolated values. diff* is equal to the counterfactual rate less the realized rate.
7. Discussion
We saw that the Bank of Greece set interest rates in accord with the Taylor principle (β 
> 1), but did not exhibit the expected response to output gaps (the expected response 
is γ > 0), and exhibited a lesser degree of interest-rate smoothing in comparison to 
Germany. The lack of response to output gaps has economic implications, although 
there is debate among economists as to whether monetary policy ought to respond to 
changes in real output. CGG (2000) conjecture that the United States’ poor monetary 
policy in the 1970’s may have arisen in part from underestimates of the “natural” rate 
of unemployment. Furthermore, Greece was at this time pursuing an exchange-rate 
target; inflation may correlate to exchange-rates in a way that real economic output 
does not. Thus, the Bank of Greece’s efforts to sustain an exchange rate program may 
have conveniently coincided with attempts to engineer a disinflation. 
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 The lesser degree of interest-rate smoothing is more difficult to explain. Perhaps 
the Bank of Greece was less able to forecast economic conditions and found the need 
to make more frequent corrections to the path of interest rates. Perhaps the Bank of 
Greece faced greater external forces in drachma money markets and was unable to 
set interest rates precisely. It is possible that interest rate smoothing in Greece was 
suboptimal; the extent to which the Bank of Greece can be faulted for this and the 
extent to which this interest-rate volatility impacted the Greek economy are uncertain.
 Notwithstanding these two discrepancies between the Bank of Greece’s policy 
and expectations, we observed that the Bank of Greece’s actual policy, excluding 
rates during two foreign exchange crises, coincided largely with a hypothetical policy 
 constructed from the Bundesbank’s estimated policy rule. Because the Bundesbank was 
historically quite highly regarded for its monetary policy, such a similarity between 
the policies of the Bundesbank and the Bank of Greece constitutes an interesting 
 “endorsement” of sorts for the Bank of Greece. Our additional counterfactual  analysis 
using the Federal Reserve serves to buttress this endorsement. Thus, the Bank of 
Greece, even while focusing mainly upon an ambitious exchange-rate target in the face 
of extraordinary speculative pressures, seemingly pursued a quite sound interest-rate 
policy. 
 On the other hand, the European Central Bank pursued an interest rate policy that 
greatly differs from the Bundesbank’s. The average real interest rate in Greece over 
the past decade has been negative. Our study finds evidence that the European Central 
Bank’s interest rate policy would destabilize prices in Greece. This would be consistent 
with the idea that the ECB sets policies that satisfy several different countries. The 
positive sign on the output gap coefficient suggests that the ECB was able to pursue 
a policy that stabilized output in Greece, but it was just such a strategy, one that 
 stabilizes output without stabilizing prices, that the Federal Reserve employed during 
the Martin-Burns-Miller years, a time not remembered fondly in the macroeconomic 
history of the United States. 
 Based upon the Bundesbank comparison, and the fact that real short-term interest 
rates have been negative for most of the past decade in Greece, it is quite possible 
that interest rates in Greece have been too low since Greece acceded to the euro. An 
extended period of monetary easing brings with it a boom, which Greece (if the data 
are to be trusted) experienced immediately after adopting the euro; the boom, however, 
often ends with the bursting of credit bubbles and with rising inflation as economic 
agents agree on prices based on high inflationary expectations. If Greek sovereign 
debt can be thought of as a credit bubble, then it seems that monetary policy could 
have contributed to the current crisis, in addition to the budget deficits and other fiscal 
problems that are commonly discussed. The existence of widening current account 
deficits in Greece throughout the 2000’s may have been exacerbated by the abundance 
of liquidity in Greek money markets, brought on by the ECB’s low interest rates.
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 Whatever criteria the European Central Bank used in setting interest rates, those 
criteria did not lead the ECB to set interest rates in accordance with the state of the 
Greek economy. Even if the GDP data for Greece were completely unreliable, the 
persistence of negative real interest rates for an extended period is generally a sign 
either of a deflationary liquidity trap, or a brewing macroeconomic calamity. 
 It would be worth pointing out that Greek monetary policy during the Greek Miracle 
(1954-1973), a period of low inflation and high growth, was constrained by the Bretton 
Woods exchange system. From 1974-1992, the Greek economy faced sluggish growth 
and persistent inflation, and, in the absence of a firm commitment to a foreign exchange 
policy, the drachma was repeatedly devalued. The period 1993-2001, like the Greek 
Miracle, was constrained by a foreign exchange program. Such a correlation could 
be mere coincidence, but it casts doubt on the assertion that rigid foreign-exchange 
programs render a central bank unable to respond to the needs of their economies.
 It would be worth asking whether Greece should have joined the eurozone to  begin 
with. Where persistent inflation differentials exist, it would be worth  determining 
whether the benefits of integrating into a monetary union outweigh the loss of interest-
rate autonomy. Indeed, Greece attained stronger inflation convergence under the Bank 
of Greece than it did under the ECB; such a result calls for further study of inflation 
differentials in monetary unions.
8. Conclusion
To summarize, we followed Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s (1998) method for estimating 
Taylor-rule coefficients and performing a counter-factual analysis to conjecture what 
the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve might have done had they been responsible 
for setting Greece’s interest rates. We determined that the Bank of Greece set  interest 
rates very similar to those “optimal Taylor rules” as proxied by the Bundesbank’s 
and Fed’s estimated Taylor rules, even after adjusting for differences in expropriation 
risk. Furthermore, we have shown that the Bank of Greece’s Taylor rule functions 
were “stabilizing” policies, whereas the ECB’s was not. We suggest that the European 
 Central Bank, in determining monetary policy for all of the eurozone, set rates that were 
too low for the economic conditions in Greece. A continued period of low nominal 
and negative real interest rates may have exacerbated sovereign debt bubbles, which 
Greece, as a euro member state, could not simply inflate away. In addition to the fiscal 
element that is often and rightly emphasized, we now add that monetary policy might 
also have contributed to Greece’s sovereign debt crisis.
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Abstract  
This article focuses on the insurance markets transition process in ten South-
Eastern Europe (SEE) post-communist countries. These insurance markets, 
characterized by a large number of small insurance companies, have been 
analyzed from several aspects in order to underline the main obstacles to their 
development. The research aims at identifying the relations between insurance 
market development and the European Union (EU) integration process as well 
as the overall economic development. To this end, indicators of the success in 
implementing these relevant processes have been identified and countries have 
been consistently ranked.
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1. Introduction
In the past two decades, the transition of the sector of financial services in 
 post-communist countries has mostly involved banks and capital markets  development. 
In these countries, the change in the insurance sector was slower, causing a clear gap 
with the Western insurance sector. Banks’ domination is evident from the official 
data about the structure of the financial service sector of the countries available in 
the  official publications from their central banks or statistical offices as well as in 
research provided by Fink et al. (2007) or Hagmayr et al. (2007). Besides worse 
 regulation and lower demand for insurance, the reason for that lies in the  special fea-
tures of the insurance industry and also in the many difficulties in its transition as well 
as, in some countries, limited economic development. The transition was even slower 
in the countries where the impact of war was devastating for the insurance sector.
 Previous studies in this field mostly focused on Central-Eastern European 
 countries whose insurance markets are commonly defined as CEE markets in the 
literature. This article is about ten post-communist countries in South-Eastern  Europe 
(SEE): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Former  Yugoslav 
 Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), Kosovo1, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and 
 Slovenia. 
 Their geographical location requires their involvement in the European Union 
(EU) enlargement process. Presently, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and more  recently, 
Croatia (from 1 July 2013), are already EU Member States, while the other countries 
are at different levels in the EU integration process. Official data about economic 
development (e.g. GDP per capita) show that the transition is much more efficient in 
countries like Slovenia (i.e. countries bordering highly developed areas).
 Before the wars of the 1990s, BiH, Croatia, FYRM, Kosovo, Montenegro, 
 Serbia and Slovenia were part of Yugoslavia, which had the most “sophisticated 
and  advanced” insurance sector of all communist countries (Rogers et al, 1988). 
 Unfortunately, the impact of the wars affected economic development, the EU 
 integration process and, in particular, the insurance markets in this region. 
 This article aims at analyzing the efficiency of the transition of the insurance 
sector in these countries in the period 2001-2010, when the most significant  changes 
happened. Therefore, the basic features of the insurance sector in the previous 
 centrally-planned communist economies will be outlined as well as the barriers to 
the transition process. The level of development in the insurance industry will be 
 measured by several indicators, providing a ranking of these countries. At the same 
time, basic indicators of economic development and EU integration level will  provide 
a ranking of the countries in these two processes. A relation between the insurance 
 sector transition and economic development as well as the EU integration process 
1. As defined under UN Security Council Resolution n. 1244.
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will also be determined. The methodology used to measure these relations is based on 
the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation, which needs countries ranked  according 
to defined criteria. The main findings provide a general overview of the transition 
level of the insurance sector in these countries, identifying prospects and challenges 
in the relevant insurance markets.
 The article is structured in six sections. Section 2 presents the literature review of 
similar research into the insurance markets in the region. Section 3 describes key ob-
stacles to the post-communist transition of insurance markets as well as the impact of 
the European integration process. Section 4 describes the efficiency of the transition 
in the insurance markets and of European integration for the countries based on data 
for the last ten years. Section 5 presents results of statistical analysis and discusses 
important relations as well as main findings. Prospects and challenges for SEE insur-
ance markets are discussed in Section 6.
2. Literature review
Very few studies were available on the insurance markets of communist  countries 
up until the 1990s. Most published works had been written by authors from the 
SEE  countries, and only a few authors from Western Europe and United  States 
took an interest in these markets, such as Rogers (1986), Rogers et al. (1988), 
 Marbacher and Furrer (1990) and Frinquelli et al. (1991). These studies pointed out 
a  monopolistic and uncompetitive insurance market, whose dynamics were driven 
by political  factors. Interest in the transition of insurance markets grew sharply in 
the 1990s,  together with the expectation of European enlargement and new  business 
 opportunities in the region. Therefore, very important contributions to the literature 
were provided by authors with professional experience in the insurance industry, 
such as Baur and Enz (1994), Baur and Hess (1995), Meyer et al. (1998),  Rüstmann 
(2001),  Birkmaier and Codoni (2002 and 2004) from Swiss Re. On the other hand, 
many  academics considered this transition process as important field for research, 
even if much more interest was shown in the development of the banking industry. 
An  important  analysis of the transition  process in the insurance market in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary was carried out by Dorfman and Ennsfellner (2001), 
who developed a  methodological framework to measure the progress of these coun-
tries in the transition process. Pye (2005) provided an accurate analysis of insurance 
market evolution in 1990-2001 in Central and Eastern European countries and in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union. This author pointed out that in many countries 
further efforts were required to implement market-based principles to the insurance 
market. Changes in regulations are only a prerequisite and a starting point in the tran-
sition process, as it takes some time to implement rules effectively and to build up an 
‘insurance culture’.  Moreover, Cooper and Dorfman (2003) pointed out that, in many 
countries, business ethical problems grew worse in the insurance industry during the 
transition process and some prevention measures had to be implemented. 
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 An important analysis of the trend of insurance market concentration during the 
transition process in Central and Eastern Europe was carried out by Tipurić et al. 
(2008). The transition process required insurance market liberalization and the  access 
of new private – and very often foreign – insurers that replaced the monopolies of 
state-owned insurers. This process introduced competition in the market, reducing 
concentration and increasing the efficiency of the sector. However, it must be noted 
that in Western European countries, with higher efficiency levels in financial  services, 
mergers and acquisitions prevailed among companies with a view to finding better 
risk diversification opportunities, resulting in increased market concentration (see, 
for example, Casu and Girardone, 2006).
 The relation between insurance market development and economic growth 
was investigated by Haiss and Sümegi (2008). These authors emphasized the role 
of  insurers as institutional investors that may provide an important  contribution to 
 economic growth at national level, if supported by an appropriate range of  investment 
 instruments and effective stock and bond markets. They identified a  positive 
 correlation between expenditure in non-life insurance premiums (as life  insurance 
was not developed yet at a sufficient level) and GDP also in SEE countries. Enz (2000) 
suggested the use of econometric models for long-term premium  forecast based on 
GDP projections. Ćurak et al. (2009) recently confirmed the  previous  findings on 
a positive relationship between the development of both life and non-life business 
and economic growth in ten countries involved in the EU transition process over the 
 period 1992-2007. 
 Kozarević et al. (2008) carried out a comparative analysis of the insurance 
 markets of the former Yugoslavia, pointing out a significant correlation between the 
EU integration process and insurance market development in these countries. This 
correlation was thoroughly investigated for the countries of the Western Balkans by 
Kozarević et al. (2011). The authors have identified insurance penetration, insurance 
density, share of life insurance premiums in total premiums, share of motor third part 
liability (MTPL) insurance premiums in total premiums and the level of the  applicable 
solvency rules as key indicators of EU integration level. An interesting analysis of 
the insurance market in SEE countries and of the role of insurers  associations in the 
EU enlargement was carried out by Kozarević (2011) in collaboration with local 
 insurance associations. This study provides detailed data and comparative analysis of 
insurance markets of SEE countries, including Greece and Turkey. 
 The EU enlargement requirements as well as the ongoing liberalisation  process 
of financial services in the EU have played a crucial role in the definition of the 
 transition process. The role of financial service liberalisation and the financial 
 market  integration processes in the EU are continuously monitored by reports of 
the  European Commission (2013) and European Central Bank (2013). The need for 
including the insurance sector in economic analysis of liberalisation and integration 
is stressed by Haiss and Fink (2006). An interesting study of the financial market 
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integration  process of new EU member States and the challenges of EU accession 
was carried out by Stirbu (2004). Unfortunately, the author neglected the insurance 
 market, but an  accurate overview of the EU accession requirements and financial 
services  development in the new EU Member States was outlined. The challenges of 
 accession become clearer, if the European insurance market integration process and its 
impacts on the EU  members are taken into consideration. Important  contributions in 
this field were made by Hess and Trauth (1998), Sterzynski (2003) and  Masciandaro 
and Quintyn (2012).
 This paper contributes to the literature providing a very serious analysis of the 
insurance market development of the countries with very specific historical,  political 
and economical environment. Regarding this, these countries differ from other parts 
of the world, even from the Central-Eastern Europe post-communist countries. 
 Moreover, another very important contribution of the paper is to show the  relationship 
between the insurance market development of these countries and two other very 
 important processes, economic development and integration into the EU ones.
3. Conceptual background
To understand the current SEE insurance environment, an overview of the  previous 
government system in these countries and its impact on the insurance sector is 
 provided. The core differences between centrally-planned and western insurance 
 systems must be identified to gain an insight into the key obstacles encountered by the 
insurance sector in its transition. At the same time, in Western Europe, the  ongoing 
European integration process has resulted in the introduction of new rules for insurers 
operating in the EU, making the transition process of SEE insurance markets even 
more challenging.
3.1 Centrally-planned vs. western insurance market conditions
Unlike competitive Western markets, the monopoly of state-owned insurers is the 
distinguishing feature of the centrally-planned insurance markets. The insurance 
 sector was nationalized after World War II and foreign insurers were expropriated. 
Decisions on all fundamental issues, like premium rating and policy provisions, were 
taken by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of the general economic policy of the 
state. Underwriting practices were not based on sound actuarial analysis, as  insurance 
was meant to be a service provided by the State with no need for profit. In this con-
text, statistics were not seriously collected and skilled staff were not specially trained 
for these jobs. As a result, there was insufficient control of adverse selection, so that 
insurance products became attractive only for customers with a level of risk above 
the average. At the same time, many insurance products were compulsory for all 
state-owned companies as well as the transfer of some risks through reinsurance. 
However, reinsurers were forced to accept all risks and a part of them only could be 
transferred abroad by retrocession. 
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 In the centrally-planned economies the trust between insurer and insured was not 
so much based on contracts and the commercial legal systems, as on state policy and 
confidence in state solvency. Some types of insurance were provided even without a 
written contract between the insurer and the insured. As pointed out by Dorfman and 
Ennsfellner (2001, p. 3-5), the absence of an insurance-oriented culture and lack of 
demand for insurance were major limits to the development of the insurance sector in 
the centrally-planned economies.
 Some other general features of the centrally-planned economies – which also 
had an impact on the insurance sector – must also be taken into account. First of 
all,  managers were not focused on company profitability and risks. As the manag-
ers’  selection was based on political affiliation, they were not motivated to take 
 responsibility for pure risks which the company’s assets and employees were exposed 
to. Personal risk management also was neglected, because the property was mostly 
state-owned, and the social security system provided a wide range of benefits. The 
underdeveloped financial sector, extremely high inflation rates and a poor economy 
were a huge burden on the development of life insurance.
 
3.2 Key obstacles to the transition process of insurance markets
SEE countries implemented their transition from a centrally-planned economy 
to a market economy in different ways. Most countries of the former Yugoslavia 
were affected by war during the 1990s, while Albania, Bulgaria and Romania were 
 extremely poor countries, at the beginning of the transition. On the other hand, 
 Slovenia  benefitted from being the closest country to the western economies. In any 
case, several specific obstacles are common to all countries.
 As a prerequisite for a thorough transformation of insurance markets, the new 
democratically-elected governments had to create a new legal and institutional 
framework with a view to implementing reforms. It took many years, especially in 
countries that had been disrupted by war. 
 As a first step in the transition of insurance markets, monopolies were  dismantled 
and supervision was introduced. The privatisation of state insurance companies 
 provided access to foreign capital and the number of active companies increased. 
There were many difficulties in this process, as Furstenberg and Junker explain 
(2005). However, new insurance regulations –very often based on  developed 
 insurance  markets in the EU without previous institutional preparation– were 
 difficult to  implement in  countries that had different legal systems. New supervisory 
 authorities had an insufficient staff potential and were not able to efficiently supervise 
a rapidly growing number of insurers in markets affected by many problems.
 The lack of an insurance-oriented culture and the economic and politic  instability 
in some countries had a negative impact on insurance market development. The 
dominant products were those featuring compulsory insurance, primarily MTPL 
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 insurance, while voluntary insurance products were long neglected. In general, 
 savings were deposited in banks and in other financial institutions than in insurance 
companies.
 Additionally, economic reforms in most SEE post-communist countries slowed 
down because of many unsolved political problems, irregularities in the  privatization 
process, slow financial consolidation of economic organizations,  exchange rate 
 instability and inflation. Inflation was one of the important obstacles to the  development 
of life insurance. Insufficient economic activities resulted in high  unemployment 
rates and reduced purchasing power of the population. Insurers’ frequent insolvency 
and delays in indemnifications made insurance services even less attractive. 
 Moreover, financial markets of SEE post-communist countries were poorly 
 regulated for years and they were not able to provide insurers with appropriate 
 investment opportunities. Even now, these markets are still at an early stage of 
 development and they offer a limited range of financial instruments.
 Finally, insurance companies need statistical databases to determine adequate 
prices for their products. Unlike Western markets, where databases cover periods of 
many decades and even up to a hundred years, in SEE post-communist countries data 
are barely available for the last couple of decades only. Additionally, data are often 
unreliable and they are not diversified, especially in countries which were deeply 
affected by war. In such a context, sound insurance premium calculations are very 
difficult.
 A lack of highly skilled managers and actuaries in insurance companies and 
 underdeveloped accounting standards unable to provide adequate information for 
internal management represent further relevant obstacles to the transition process 
(Dorfman and Ennsfellner, 1998).
3.3 Impact of the European integration process
With the fall of communism, expectations for a wider European Single Market 
 involving Central and Eastern European countries were raised. In 1993, the EU 
 Single Market was completed with the introduction of the free movement of  people, 
goods, services and capital. Additionally, the EU Council defined the following 
 criteria for European accession (as reported in the Conclusions of the Presidency of 
the  European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993): 
●  ‘Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
and respect for the protection of minorities;
●  The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with the competitive pressure and the market forces within the Union;
●   The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union’.
 Candidate countries had also to come to terms with the ongoing western  countries’ 
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market integration process. In 1994, an important step towards the  European  insurance 
market integration process was taken with the implementation of the third  generation 
directives (92/49/ECC and 92/96/ECC), which introduced some  fundamental 
 principles: the single EU license on transactions anywhere in EU, the home country 
control and the deregulation of prices and conditions, leaving to  supervisors only 
the control over insurer solvency. Deregulated insurance markets are expected to 
result in a better risk diversification in both underwriting and investment activities 
and higher efficiency and competition. Additionally, a wider range of new and/or 
 innovative products can be introduced to satisfy a wider range of  customer needs. 
The higher level of integration reached in the European  insurance market in recent 
years also translated into an increase in the number of foreign  companies,  global 
competition and a wave of mergers and acquisitions – that resulted in increased 
 market  concentration. However, the creation of a single market has been hampered 
by some not harmonized but very important different local rules, as, for example, the 
regulation on taxation, accounting principles, contracts, solvency, thus preventing the 
creation of a European playing field for insurers (Sterzynski, 2003). The  Solvency II 
project –defining the new solvency rules for European insurers– and the IFRS project 
–defining common accounting standards for companies in the EU– are  examples of 
the further measures needed to support the single European market. The financial 
 crisis and the need for recovery strategies are new challenges for the market. In such 
an environment, SEE countries have to adapt their legal and institutional  environment 
to these new requirements for European insurers.
4. Empirical analysis
The success of the transition of insurance markets and the European integration  process 
in the SEE post-communist countries depends on many factors.  Therefore, estimates 
of the progress in these processes must be based on several key  indicators. A  ranking 
of the countries based on these key criteria may result in very  important  findings 
and correlations. Some relevant studies have been published on the  relationship 
 between insurance sector development and economic growth (Pye 2005, Tipurić et 
al. 2008, Haiss and Sümegi 2008, 2009) in some post-communist parts of Europe, 
but this work focuses on the relationship between insurance market  development and 
 European integration process in the SEE post-communist countries.
4.1 Estimate of transition in insurance markets and of European integration  efficiency
Efficiency of transition in insurance markets of the SEE post-communist countries 
can be defined as level of development of insurance markets. The benchmark used for 
the estimate is the level of development of the insurance market of the EU countries. 
To assess the efficiency of transition, the following indicators of insurance market 
environment progress and market development have been applied:
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●  Legal and institutional environment,
●  Solvency standards,
●  Insurance penetration,
●  Insurance density,
●  Share of life insurance,
●  Share of MTPL insurance.
 The analysis of the legal framework aims at describing the main changes that have 
occurred in the national insurance regulations and consistency with EU directives. 
The insurance market institutional framework has also to be taken into consideration 
to determine the ability of supervisors and other institutions to implement the new 
regulations successfully. Solvency standards are the indicators of the  access level 
of the insurance market, as they define the minimum amount of equity required to 
ensure the insurer’s capacity to meet its obligations. Insurance penetration is the ratio 
between insurance premiums and the national GDP and it points to the role of the 
insurance sector in the national economy. Insurance density is the most revealing 
indicator of insurance market development, as it consists of the  average amount of 
premiums per capita or –in other terms– the amount of money each  citizen spends 
on insurance per year. Insurance penetration and density indicators are typically 
used in the comparative analysis of the achieved development levels of different 
insurance markets. The share of life insurance premium in the total premium  income 
 determines the consumer’s familiarity with financial transactions. Finally, as the 
MTPL  insurance is compulsory in all the countries included in this assessment, its 
share in the total  premiums is a good indicator of the insurance-oriented culture or of 
the lack of  interest in voluntary insurance products. 
 The progress of SEE post-communist countries in the European integration 
 process can be evaluated in terms of the level of compliance with the previously 
described main EU accession criteria (political criteria, economic criteria and ability 
to comply with EU obligations). On the basis of the EU 2010 progress reports for 
candidate and potential candidate countries, a qualitative overall judgment can be 
made with a view to consistently ranking SEE post-communist countries.
4.2 Comparative analysis of transition in insurance markets and of European 
 integration efficiency
In this study, empirical analysis is based on the data from the past ten years. 
 Unfortunately, as previously underlined, longer historical series are either not 
 available or not reliable. Since 2001, insurance market statistics have been   collected 
and  processed by supervision authorities or by insurers associations in official  reports. 
These are the sources of data that have been used in this study. Whenever  official 
 reports were not available, data were collected directly from country’s  insurers 
 associations reports or using Swiss Re World insurance reports. Additionally, the 
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most recent available official reports on the EU enlargement process have been used. 
SEE countries’ insurance markets comparative analysis is based on the above 
 mentioned indicators of insurance market development. Whenever quantitative 
 indicators were not available, as for the legal and institutional framework, a simple 
ranking based on 2010 information has been worked out. The transition indicator 
provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as the 
methodology developed for financial markets by Haiss and Kichler (2009) can also 
be used for ranking. For a better insight into the assessment, a preliminary short 
 review of basic macroeconomics has been outlined.
4.2.1 Basic macroeconomics
All the analyzed countries have had positive trends in their basic macroeconomics, but 
the level of their economic development is still far from the level of the  industrialized 
Western countries. In recent years, the economic crisis has disrupted the high rates of 
GDP growth of the previous period. Detailed comparisons of SEE post-communist 
countries GDP per capita over the period 2001-2010 are reported in Figure 1.
Figure 1. GDP per capita in the period 2001-2010 (EUR)
 Sources: Compiled by the authors from official national statistic reports
In 2010, the total population of these countries was 54,103 million, accounting for 
6.7 percent of the European population (including transcontinental countries) and 
10.8 percent of the EU population (including Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia). The 
total GDP of the countries was equal to EUR 296,401 million, i.e. 2.4 percent of the 
EU total GDP (Purchasing Power Standards). GDP per capita in all these countries 
149S. KOZAREVIĆ, L. PERESSIN, G. VALENTINUZ, South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics
2 (2013) 139-164
was EUR 5,478, i.e. 4.5 times lower than the GDP per capita in the EU, resulting in 
a very significant gap in economic development with EU countries. Slovenia and 
Croatia only had a GDP per capita exceeding EUR 10,000 in 2010. Unfortunately, the 
economic crisis halted the long-term trend of GDP growth in all countries.
4.2.2 Legal and institutional environment
The creation of an appropriate legal and institutional framework is the first step in 
the SEE post-communist transition of insurance markets. The related changes  require 
a different time frame and countries are in different stages of the  implementation 
as,  using reports of the countries’ supervisory authorities, summarized below. 
Since there are no quantitative measures of progress in the legal and institutional 
 environment, a ranking of the SEE countries can be based on the analysis of the laws 
and  bylaws  introduced in accordance with EU regulations as well as of the efficiency 
of  established supervisory institutions and insurance associations. 
 Slovenia has been the most successful in this process. The new insurance law 
was introduced in 2000, followed by many amendments and secondary legislative 
acts, increasing the frequency of changes as the market started preparing for the new 
Solvency II standards. The compulsory MTPL insurance law has also been  amended 
many times. The Insurance Supervisory Agency became operational in 2000. The 
Slovenian Insurance Association, founded in 1992, is a member of the CEA  (European 
Insurance and Reinsurance Federation).
 In view of the EU enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania had to increase the pace of 
changes in their legal and institutional frameworks. The Bulgarian insurance market 
is regulated by the code on insurance introduced in 2005 on insurance and  reinsurance 
undertakings, insurance and reinsurance intermediaries, state  supervision over 
 insurance (reinsurance) activities and intermediation as well as insurance  contracts 
and compulsory insurance. The market is supervised by the  Financial  Supervision 
Commission established in 2003. It is a single supervisor for the  non-banking 
 financial sector (insurance, pension schemes, securities market). In Romania, the 
law on  insurance business and insurance supervision was  introduced in 2000. The 
 amendments to the law, including compulsory MTPL insurance, were  introduced in 
2002. The  Insurance Supervisory Commission, an independent  insurance  supervision 
authority, was founded in 2000. The Association of Bulgarian Insurers and the 
 National Association of Insurance and Reinsurance Companies from Romania are 
members of the CEA.
 Croatia insurance law and the Act on Compulsory Insurance within the  Transport 
Sector were introduced in 2005 and the Croatian Financial Services Supervisory 
Agency was established in the same year as supervisory authority for the insurance 
market as well as for other non-banking financial services. The Croatian Insurance 
Bureau, i.e. the insurers’ associations, is a member of the CEA.
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 In Serbia, the legal framework on the insurance market changed in 2004, when 
a new insurance law was introduced. The law on compulsory motor insurance was 
 introduced in 2009. Supervision has been implemented by the National Bank of 
 Serbia since 2004. The Association of Serbian Insurers is a representative of the 
 insurers in Serbia.
 Against the backdrop of its constitutional constraints, BiH has a very complex  legal 
and institutional framework for its small insurance market. The insurance  business is 
structured and regulated at entity level (Federation of BiH and  Republic of Srpska), 
with the Insurance Agency of BiH providing a sort of supervision at state level. The 
state agency is not a supervisory authority and its role is to harmonize the entities’ 
legislation and the supervisory work of the entities’ agencies, to  process  statistical 
data at the state level, and to represent the country in international  relations. The 
law on the state insurance agency was introduced in 2004. Entity laws on  insurance 
as well as entity laws on MTPL insurance and laws on insurance mediation were 
 introduced in 2005. Insurance companies are members of two insurance associations 
and their activities are very often coordinated by the state agency.
 Albania adopted the new law on insurance, reinsurance and intermediation in 
insurance and reinsurance in 2004. MTPL insurance is now regulated by the law 
on compulsory insurance in the transport sector, introduced in 2009. The insurance 
market is supervised by the Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority established 
in 2006. The Albanian Insurers Association is active and it includes insurers and 
 intermediaries operating in Albania.
 FYRM insurance supervision law was adopted in 2002, and the law on MTPL 
 insurance was introduced in 2005. In 2009, the Insurance Supervision Agency took 
over the role of the insurance sector supervisor from the Ministry of Finance. The 
National Insurance Bureau is the insurers’ association in FYRM.
 A new insurance law in Montenegro was adopted at the end of 2006. Other 
 regulations on MTPL insurance, bankruptcy and winding-up of insurance  companies 
were  introduced in 2007. Supervision of the insurance sector is implemented by 
an  independent supervisory agency established in 2008. The National Bureau of 
 Insurers, as the insurers; association, was established in 2007.
 In the light of Kosovo’s special status (under UN Resolution 1244), a specific 
 legislation known as the Insurance Rules has been enacted. The insurance market is 
supervised by the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo. The Insurance  Association 
of Kosovo (IAK) was founded in 2002.
4.2.3 Solvency Standards
Regulators have set specific solvency standards in terms of solvency margin and 
minimal capital requirements so that insurers have a sufficient financial capacity. 
Most of these countries adapted their solvency standards to the EU directives. In the 
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EU, solvency standards were regulated for the first time in 1973 with the Directive of 
the European Economic Community on non-life insurance (73/239/EEC) and in 1979 
on life insurance (79/267/EEC). Despite the fact that specified standards were not 
adequate, these rules remained unchanged for almost three decades. New standards, 
known as ‘Solvency I’, were established at the beginning of this century  (directives 
2002/13/EC on non-life insurance and 2002/83/EC on life insurance). Under these 
standards, the minimum guaranty fund was increased to EUR 2.0-3.0 million from 
EUR 0.2-1.4 million. The basis for the calculation of the solvency margin for  non-life 
insurance was also increased to 18 percent of the premiums below EUR 50.0  million 
and to 16 percent for premiums exceeding EUR 35.0 million (previously it was EUR 
10.0 million) or to 26 percent of the claims below EUR 35.0 millions and to 23 percent 
for claims above EUR 35.0 million (previously it was EUR 7.0 million). The higher 
amount of the two is the solvency margin. The latest solvency  regulation, known as 
‘Solvency II’, is more ambitious and it aims at making the  solvency  requirements 
more sensitive to insurer risk exposures. It is expected to be fully implemented in 
2016. The solvency standards currently in force in these  countries are listed in Table 1.
4.2.4 Insurance penetration and density
The best indicators of insurance market development level are insurance penetration 
and insurance density. A preliminary comparison of the total insurance premium data 
among countries is shown in Figure 2.
 The SEE post-communist countries total premiums in 2010 were EUR 7,286 
 million, i.e. 0.68 percent of the total premiums in the EU. As the population of these 
countries accounts for 10.8 percent of the EU overall population, clearly there is a 
huge gap as compared to the EU market. The insurance markets of these  countries 
had positive trends until 2009 when, as a consequence of the economic crisis, 
 stagnation or decreases in premiums were reported. Romania had the most intensive 
premium growth over the last decade, but it was also affected by the highest decrease 
in  premiums after 2009. In spite of the significant growth in premiums over the last 
decade, however, in all countries growth was expected to be sharper in view of their 
level of economic development and the changes implemented in their markets.
 Insurance penetration – the share of insurance premiums in the total GDP – shows 
the role of insurance in the economy. In 2010, the average insurance penetration 
in these countries was 2.46 percent, pointing to a low level of insurance market 
 development if compared with 8.55 percent at EU level. Additionally, as shown in 
Figure 3, except in Slovenia, insurance penetration in the other countries has not 
changed significantly in the past ten years.
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Table 1. Current solvency standards
 Note: Minimum capital requirements for countries are converted into EUR at the exchange rate 
of 7 December 2011
 Source: National insurance laws and by-laws
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Figure 2. Total premiums in the period 2001-2010 (EUR millions)
 Sources: Compiled by the authors from official national insurance supervisory authority or 
insurance association reports
Figure 3. Insurance penetration in the period 2001-2010 (percent)
 Sources: Compiled by the authors from official national insurance supervisory authority or 
insurance association reports
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 In 2010, the average insurance density –the amount of premiums per capita– 
in these countries was EUR 134.68. The fact that in the EU in 2010 the insurance 
 density was EUR 2,090 shows that development is in a very critical phase. Trends in 
insurance density are reported in Figure 4. At the beginning of 2001, an extremely 
low level was reported. Except for Slovenia (EUR 1,022), Croatia (EUR 284) and 
Bulgaria (EUR 114), all other countries still have the features of poor markets with 
insurance density below EUR 100.
Figure 4. Insurance density in the period 2001-2010 (EUR)
 Sources: Compiled by the authors from official national insurance supervisory authority or 
insurance association reports
4.2.5 Shares of life and MTPL insurance
In 2010, in these SEE countries, the average share of life insurance in the total  premiums 
was 22.14 percent. In comparison with a share of 61.6 percent of life  insurance at EU 
level, the absence of an insurance-oriented culture becomes clear. The low share of 
life insurance is the result of macroeconomic instability,  consumer unfamiliarity with 
financial transactions, and a low level of specialisation in the  available insurance 
products. As shown in Figure 5, Slovenia (28.8 percent) and Croatia (26.5 percent) 
are the only countries in the sample with a share of life  insurance above 20 percent.
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Figure 5. Shares of life and MTPL insurance in 2010 (percent)
 Sources: Compiled by the authors from official national insurance supervisory authority or 
insurance association reports
Similarly, the shares of MTPL insurance in the total premiums confirmed the  absence 
of an insurance-oriented culture. The dominant market share of compulsory MTPL 
insurance, with an average of 28.9 percent, shows a very low level of interest in 
voluntary non-life insurance products. In 2010, the share of MTPL insurance was 
extremely high in Kosovo, Albania, BiH, Montenegro and FYRM, with a peak 
 exceeding 40 percent of the total market (Figure 5).
4.2.6 European integration efficiency
European integration efficiency is the level of integration of the SEE  post-communist 
countries into the EU. The level of European integration can be estimated on the 
 basis of the official information provided by the EU on the monitoring of the progress 
made by candidate and potential candidate countries. A simple ranking of these 
SEE  post-communist countries has been determined as reported in Table 3. This is 
 necessary for later calculation of correlation coefficients. As Slovenia, Romania, 
 Bulgaria and Croatia are already EU members, their integration process is already 
completed. Slovenia joined the EU in 2004 and it adopted the Euro in 2007 while 
Bulgaria and Romania became EU members in 2007. Croatia joined the EU more 
recently, in July 2013.
 FYRM has been a candidate country for EU membership since the end of 2005, 
while Montenegro is a candidate country and applied for EU membership at the end 
of 2008 with the prospect of joining the EU in the medium term. Albania applied for 
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EU membership in 2009 and Serbia at the end of the same year. Both countries were 
potential candidates in 2010, with Albania being in the accession  process for a longer 
time. For this reason in Table 3, Albania has a better ranking than Serbia in terms of 
integration level. However, in 2012 Serbia reached the status of candidate country, 
while Albania was recommended as a candidate country by the European  Commission 
under the condition of complying with some final  requirements. BiH is a potential 
candidate for EU membership. The country does not meet yet the  political criteria, 
because of the lack of institutional stability and a weak political drive.  Kosovo is a 
potential candidate for EU membership. However, the  Copenhagen political criteria 
are far from being achieved in the light of the problems in international recognition 
and cooperation. Therefore, Kosovo ranks tenth in terms of European integration 
level (EU Commission, 2010).
5. Outcomes and discussion
After the previous analysis of insurance market development and market transition 
efficiency indicators, the relations between the insurance markets’ development and 
the two following processes in the SEE post-communist countries:
●  process of economic development of the national economies, and
●  process of EU integration
have been investigated.
5.1 Relationship between the efficiency of transition of insurance markets and the 
level of economic development
With the Spearman coefficient, the correlation between the efficiency of transition 
(development) of insurance markets and the level of economic development rank 
can be identified. Ranks for these countries are reported in Table 2. The  economic 
 development ranking is based on the GDP per capita (from Figure 1), while the 
 transition of insurance markets is based on the six previously analyzed indicators of 
development.
5.2 Relationship between the efficiency of transition of insurance markets and 
 efficiency in the European integration process
The relationship between the transition efficiency of insurance markets and the 
level of EU integration is investigated in terms of correlation between the rank of 
 countries in the EU integration process and each of the insurance market transition 
indicators, as reported in Table 3. The correlation coefficients show if the progress in 
the EU  integration is expected to be followed by better results in insurance market 
 development and vice versa, based on the indicators used for the analysis.
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Table 2. Ranking correlation between GDP per capita and development of insurance 
market
Table 3. Ranking correlation between level of integration into the EU and  development 
of insurance markets
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5.3 Main findings
Results from Table 2 and Table 3 are summarized in Table 4, showing relationships 
between these processes. Values of the Spearman coefficients show a very strong 
correlation between the two ranking comparisons, transition of insurance markets 
and the level of economic development as well as between the transition of  insurance 
markets and the level of EU integration. Table 4 points out that some aspects of 
the transition of insurance markets (insurance penetration, insurance density and 
shares of life insurance) tend to depend on the level of economic development, while 
 other aspects (legal and institutional framework as well as solvency standards) tend 
to  depend more on the level of EU integration. The main reasons for the very low 
level of insurance market development and their relationship with the two previously 
 mentioned processes may be explained as follows.
Table 4. Comparison between ranking correlation coefficients for GDP per capita 
and level of integration into the EU
First, many problems remain with the supervision of the insurance sector. In  general, 
insurers have inadequate tariffs for many types of insurance or, if the tariffs are 
 indeed adequate, premium individualization is very popular on the market. Most 
countries do not have databases for proper actuarial calculations, because histori-
cal data series are not adequate or the market is very small. The existence of a large 
number of small insurers compounds the premium calculation and prevents any con-
trol of the  supervisory authority over tariffs. Namely, according to official  reports 
of  supervisory authorities, there were 127 active insurance companies with less 
than three percent of the respective national insurance markets in 2010. Frequently, 
 supervisory  solvency control does not achieve its basic goal – i.e. early identification 
of insurers with an  inadequate level of solvency. The delay with which supervisors 
respond to an  insurer’s solvency problem sometimes makes any actions ineffective. 
Therefore,  significant  efforts by supervisory authorities have to be made in order to 
establish well-regulated markets. Supervision provides the conditions for the  efficient 
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operation of insurers, minimizing their insolvency risk through: capital  requirements, 
technical reserves control and control over investment of reserves. Currently the 
 implementation of all these three sectors of supervision is questionable and needs 
to be improved in several countries. Customer protection, aimed at  increasing the 
level of confidence in  insurers, is generally increasing. It is typically achieved by: 
the licensing of  insurers, the licensing of intermediaries, giving  approval on condi-
tions for every type of  insurance contract and controlling an insurer’s  transactions 
on the market. However, supervisory  authorities generally have insufficient staff, 
they are insufficiently involved in the  insurer  operations control and sometimes 
they have problems in applying a  transparent process to the withdrawal of licenses. 
 Therefore, the implementation of new regulations is very difficult and it will be even 
more  difficult in the future, when rules will have to be fully in line with the new EU 
 standards (Solvency II). 
 Additionally, some insurance companies, with their unprofessional  behavior, 
significantly hamper market development and the work of supervisors.  Reinsurance 
policies are very often undefined, causing frequent insolvencies and delays in 
 indemnification. As a result, the loss of confidence in the insurance sector is  obvious. 
Too many insurers concentrating on relatively small and undeveloped markets  keenly 
compete on insurance policy prices to conquer small market shares. Insurers are 
mostly focused on the basic products only, without investing in their  differentiation 
or in new products. Compulsory MTPL insurance accounts for 28.9 percent of the 
region total premiums. A small share of life (22.1 percent) and other types of  non-life 
 products (49 percent) are the best indicators of the lack of  insurance culture due to 
poor  consumer familiarity with insurance functions and low  sophistication of the 
 insurance  products offered. As these are average data for the region, the  structure of 
the  insurance  products in some countries is drastically worse (Figure 5).  Unfortunately, 
 insurers and their associations seem unable either to stimulate the demand for 
 insurance products or to actively promote education to ensure proper management. 
Educational programs have just started being offered by universities or market 
 players, but the training of highly skilled staff, especially for actuarial jobs, takes 
some time.  Additionally, unfair  competition is widespread in many forms, such as 
pricing products below the required premium, the concealment of some  unfavourable 
terms in insurance  contracts, the assignment of unreasonable bonuses to the insured 
to retain their loyalty, preferences for some insurance brokers  irrespective of any 
 economic reasons, or the spreading of false information about competitors, etc. 
 Unfair  competition results in a low level of cooperation among  insurers to solve the 
problems of the market, affecting the role of the associations in promoting market 
development as well as in negotiating with the regulators.
 With the progress in the transition process, SEE post-communist countries have 
become aware of the important economic role of insurance and other risk  management 
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techniques. In spite of this – as a consequence of a state-owned economy, a strong 
national social security system as well as a lack of education in risk management 
– pure industrial risks and personal risks are often not perceived. The property of 
many public companies is still almost unprotected from pure risks and personal risk 
 management and insurance culture are also undeveloped.
 Finally, countries at a late stage in the EU integration process still have many 
unsolved political problems which impose a huge burden on the development of their 
economies. Financial consolidation of many economic entities has slowed down and 
their insolvency has been increasing and exerting great pressure on the whole  economy. 
High unemployment rates result in poor spending capacity of the  population. The 
 privatization process of the previously state-owned  companies, which was  ridden 
with irregularities, has slowed down, hampering the  implementation of economic 
reforms. Foreign direct investments are not as intensive as  governments expected. All 
these factors contribute to create a very adverse environment for  insurance  market 
 development (Rüstmann, 2001). Additionally, poor and  insufficiently  regulated 
 financial markets affect insurers’ transactions,  which have to focus strictly on 
a  proper reserve funds investment. The change in the structure of the population 
with an increasing ‘elderly population’ shows that the reform of social insurance 
systems cannot be further delayed. The current global economic crisis involving 
 several  economic areas (banking, real estate, car sales, industrial  production, etc.) 
also slowed down  insurance sector development. Life insurance premiums fell as 
a consequence of a lower consumer income, an increased unemployment rate and 
pessimistic expectations of future financial stability. The insurance sector in the SEE 
markets stagnated during 2008 and 2009. Data for 2010 show some first signs of 
recovery and, hopefully, this trend will be more evident in the long term. 
6. Conclusion
The European integration process is one of the most important political and 
 economic issues for SEE post-communist countries. This analysis shows that the 
more  integrated with the EU the countries are, the more developed their insurance 
markets are. An expected higher level of EU integration in the future will result in 
an enhanced  competitiveness and a wider availability of insurance products. As the 
establishment of a single EU insurance market offers insurers the opportunity to sell 
their products in the whole of the EU region, SEE post-communist markets offer 
good growth opportunities for Western insurers, some of which are already active in 
the region. On the other hand, domestic insurers are not yet competitive enough in 
the old EU members’ markets.
 Social insurance systems still play a dominant role in SEE post-communist 
 countries. Industrialized countries have already reformed such systems years ago, as 
they were aware that they were not sustainable because of the demographic trends. The 
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SEE region, with its poor economies and high unemployment rates, had no  alternative 
but to start with the reforms. However, the process is rather slow. The  pension system 
reforms are generally based on the introduction of three  pillars, where the devel-
opment of the second (fully funded plans with defined  contributions) and the third 
(voluntary private funded plans, savings plans, life insurance, etc.)  pillars  requires 
important legal preconditions.  On the other hand, the low standard of living and 
undeveloped financial markets make the transition to the new pension scheme very 
slow and difficult, even if the level of pensions provided by the existing system forces 
people to save additional funds for their retirement. That represents an  opportunity 
for the development of new life insurance products.  Additionally, in most SEE coun-
tries health insurance systems inherited from the past are  characterized by a wide 
range of benefits, but with a poor quality of service.  Problems with  inefficiency and 
irregularities of the existing state health insurance already require the  development 
of a private health insurance system. Of course, many legal and institutional barriers 
have to be removed to support voluntary health insurance and private providers of 
health services. 
 At the same time, as changes in pension and health insurance systems increase 
people’s awareness of the importance of personal risk management, companies start 
perceiving the importance of risk management and insurance products in the sector 
of personal as well as property and liability risks. Education in risk management 
contributes to the development of the insurance culture and it is becoming common 
in formal education and in universities. Many higher education institutions offer 
 specialized programs in risk management, insurance and actuarial sciences, ensuring 
training also for actuarial profiles. Insurers, for which the skills of their employees 
are one of their main sources of competitive advantage, offer training programs to 
train their staff to provide high quality service and to assist clients in managing risks. 
Insurers’ associations must play a very active role in training, as they have an interest 
in providing more regulations of insurers, increasing the level of confidence in the 
sector. This is particularly necessary considering the fact that there are so many small 
insurers operating in the markets.
 During the transition period, important changes have been implemented to  create 
a proper regulatory environment for insurance companies. The capacity of the 
 supervisory authorities is improving, but they are not strong enough to fully  implement 
all the EU Directives. Therefore, SEE post-communist countries still have different 
capital adequacy requirements, reflecting the specific conditions of their markets and 
the financial potential of their companies. Some projects have been implemented, with 
the support of the European Commission, in financial  sector  regulation  development, 
with the insurance sector as a special area of interest.  Solvency II, the new regulatory 
framework, is a new challenge for the insurance  market, but unfortunately only a few 
countries of the SEE region are seriously preparing for it.
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 The process of integration of SEE post-communist countries into the EU is not 
completed and it will be a core political and economical issue for these countries in 
the coming years. On the other hand, the insurance markets of these countries are still 
in transition and their expansion is expected. While this research is focused on the 
end of the first decade of this century, the relationships between these two processes 
as well as trends of correlation coefficients will still be interesting fields of research 
in the coming years. However, some additional assumptions have to be taken into 
consideration. Namely, as this research confirmed, SEE is a region of “two speeds” 
with Slovenia leading the region and BiH and Kosovo, as countries that suffered 
from war, lagging behind. Future research should also be focused on the  application 
of the new Solvency II regime to insurance markets of SEE countries as well as 
the  consequences of the recent economic crisis, like Panagiotou (2013) and Schich 
(2010) explained.
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Abstract  
The role of deposit insurance and the design features of deposit insurance systems 
are undergoing important changes in light of the 2008/9 global crisis. Changes 
were made in order to restore the public confidence in the banking system, stop 
widespread bank runs during the crisis and increase the stability of the financial 
system. The purpose of this paper is to present the changes in deposit insurance 
around the world as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Three main changes 
will be observed: the raising of the maximum level of deposit insurance coverage, 
the elimination of coinsurance and changes in the speed of depositor’s payout. 
Effects of these changes will be analyzed, and special emphasis will be laid on the 
deposit insurance system of the Republic of Macedonia.
The changes in deposit insurance can affect the moral hazard problem, the 
premium assessment base and the potential financial commitment of the 
deposit insurance institution. Changes in the deposit insurance regulations of 
the Republic of Macedonia did not affect the premium assessment base, but the 
potential financial obligation of the deposit insurance institution was increased. 
Regarding the moral hazard problem mitigation, Deposit Insurance Fund - Skopje 
should consider risk-based premium introduction.  
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Introduction
A deposit insurance system (DIS) refers to the set of specific functions (whether 
 performed by a dedicated legal entity or not) inherent in providing protection to bank 
depositors, and their relationship with other financial system safety net participants 
to support financial stability1. An effective DIS is an important pillar of the financial 
safety net and plays a key role in contributing to the stability of the financial system 
and protection of depositors (Financial Stability Board, 2012).
 The role of deposit insurance and deposit protection is undergoing important 
changes in light of the 2008/9 global crisis. Assumptions about the role of deposit 
protection in maintaining financial stability have evolved and its role in the  safety net 
has been clarified and strengthened. The main purpose of deposit insurance, as a part 
of the global financial stability framework, before the crisis, was  protection of the 
small depositor, who doesn’t understand and monitor the risk taken by the  financial 
 institutions. After the crisis, maintaining and strengthening the stability of the 
 financial system was set as the primary goal of the deposit insurance and  protection 
of the small depositor as secondary (Bernet and Walter, 2009).
 The crisis resulted in greater convergence in practices across jurisdictions and 
an emerging consensus about appropriate features of the deposit insurance system. 
These include higher (and in case of the EU, more harmonized) coverage levels; the 
elimination of coinsurance; the adoption of ex-ante funding by more jurisdictions; 
and the strengthening of information sharing and coordination with other safety 
net participants. The mandates of deposit insurers also evolved, with more of them 
 assuming responsibilities beyond a pay-box function to include involvement in the 
resolution process.
 The purpose of this paper is to present the changes in deposit insurance in various 
countries of the world as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Three main changes 
will be observed: the raising of the maximum level of deposit insurance coverage, 
the elimination of coinsurance and changes in the speed of depositors’ payout. Effects 
of these changes will be analyzed, and special emphasis will be laid on the deposit 
insurance system of the Republic of Macedonia.
Raising the maximum level of coverage
The crisis revealed the importance of effective deposit insurance as a key element of 
the global financial stability framework. A loss of confidence was observed during 
the crisis. In response to this anxiety, some authorities increased the coverage of their 
1. A financial safety net typically consists of prudential regulation and supervision, emergency 
lender of last resort, problem bank insolvency frameworks, and deposit insurance. In many 
jurisdictions, a department of the government (e.g. ministry of finance or treasury) is also 
included in the safety net.
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deposit insurance scheme or even provided an explicit deposit blanket guarantee. The 
adoption of higher deposit insurance coverage level was made in order to prevent the 
transmission of panic from debt investors to depositors. The increase of deposit insur-
ance coverage helped restore public confidence in the banking system, stopped wide-
spread bank runs during the crisis and increased the stability of the financial systems.
 Before the crisis the minimum deposit insurance coverage level in EU was set 
at EUR 20,000 (Directive 94/19/EC). In 2009, with the new Directive 2009/14/EC, 
amending Directive 94/19/EC, the coverage level – the previous provision on the 
minimum coverage limit (EUR 20,000) was replaced by the following limits: 
●  By June 30th 2009, the EU member states shall ensure that the coverage of the 
aggregate deposits of each deposit shall be at least EUR 50,000 in the event of 
deposits being unavailable;
●  By December 31st 2010, the EU member states shall ensure that the coverage of 
the aggregate deposits of each deposit shall be at EUR 100,000 in the event of 
deposits being unavailable.
 The EU countries have adjusted the coverage level with the new directive and four 
EU countries (Denmark, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia) have even set  unlimited 
 deposit insurance coverage (European Commission, 2011).
 In the United States, the maximum amount of insurance coverage was raised 
 (temporarily) from USD 100,000 to USD 250,000 in October 2008. In the same 
 period Australia and New Zealand have introduced explicit deposit insurance schemes 
with unlimited deposit insurance coverage and deposit insurance coverage of NZD 
1,000,000 respectively (Schich, 2008).
Chart 1: Deposit insurance coverage before and after 2008 crisis2 
 
 Source: Author
2. The data on deposit insurance coverage have been collected from the web sites of the national 
institutions for deposit insurance of the selected countries and the national laws on deposit 
insurance.
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 Chart No 1 shows changes in deposit insurance coverage in the countries in the 
region as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. All the countries presented in the chart 
(except for Albania and Macedonia) have increased their deposit insurance coverage 
to a maximum of 50,000 EUR. The increase was made not only for the purpose of 
restoring public  confidence in the banking system, but also for adjusting the national 
regulations with the EU regulations, since all these countries are aspirants for EU 
membership.
 Deposit insurance coverage in Republic of Macedonia before the increase of 
 December 2010, was EUR 20,000 i.e. it was adjusted to the demands of EU  Directive 
94/19/EC. The crisis did not directly affect the stability of the  Macedonian  financial 
system, no deposit withdrawal was detected, and the deposits of the  physical 
 persons even had a permanent growth during the crisis years. But still the  deposit 
 insurance coverage was increased to EUR 30,000 and that increase was a step 
 forward to  adjusting the Macedonian regulations on deposit insurance with the new 
EU  Directive 2009/14/EC. The changes in the Law on Deposit Insurance Fund with 
article 22  provide for full compliance with EU Directive 2009/14/EC regarding the 
insurance coverage from the date of the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to 
the  European Union.
 Three basic problems can occur from the increase of deposit insurance coverage:
1) High deposit insurance coverage can initiate moral hazard;
2) Increase of the deposit insurance coverage can increase the premium assessment 
base;
3) Increase of the deposit insurance coverage can increase the potential financial 
commitment of the deposit insurance institution.
 Moral hazard refers to the fact that if people don’t have to face consequences, 
they tend to take on more risk than they should (Sit, 2007). Increase of the deposit 
 insurance coverage can give rise to moral hazard both on the part of depositors, who 
may reduce their monitoring and “policing” efforts, as well as on the part of banks, 
which may perceive a lessening of the threat of market discipline. Therefore  deposit 
insurance coverage level should be capable of preserving market discipline and 
 minimize the problem of moral hazard.
 One of the criteria used for evaluating the level of coverage is the amount of 
deposits or number of depositors that it covers. In theory, a limit that covers at least 
80 percent of depositors and 20 percent of deposits is generally considered adequate. 
Another criterion is the value of the deposit insurance coverage as a proportion of 
GDP per capita. IMF suggests that deposit insurance coverage should vary from 1 to 
2 GDP per capita (Garcia, 1999).
 The ratio of coverage level to per capita GDP among the countries of the world 
has significantly changed since the 2008 crisis. Before the crisis the average ratio for 
Europe was 1.4 and since the crisis it has risen to 4.8. In the Asia/Pacific region the 
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average ratio before the crisis was 2.2, and since the crisis has risen to 26.8. The ratio 
of coverage level to per capita GDP in USA has risen as well from 2.1 before the 
 crisis to 5.4 after the crisis (Hoelscher, 2011). The value of this ratio in the Republic 
of Macedonia is much higher than the European average. In 2009 it was 6.1, and 
since the increase in 2010 the value of this ratio has risen to 8.73.
 Regarding the deposits that it covers, deposit insurance coverage of the  Republic 
of Macedonia, even before the increase of 2010, has covered around 99 percent of the 
deposits (Gosev, 2008).The increase in EU coverage to EUR 100,000 will  effectively 
cover over 98 percent of all depositors and 60 percent of the value of  deposits. Many of 
the newer EU members with relatively small financial systems will have 100  percent 
deposit coverage for all depositors. The US made the  temporary USD 250,000 limit 
permanent and will fully cover 99.8 percent of depositors and 78  percent of the value 
of deposits. These post-crisis levels of protection are significantly higher than the 
often-cited 80/20 “rule of thumb” used prior to the crisis (Hoelscher, 2011).
 The financial crisis has led to a re-evaluation of the methodology for  determining 
appropriate coverage levels. Since the crisis, the role of deposit insurance in 
 promoting financial stability has taken precedence over concerns about contributing 
to moral hazard. In the midst of a crisis, one should not be overly concerned with 
moral hazard. Restoring the depositors’ confidence should be the first priority.
 Although a high coverage level reduces the incentives for depositors to run, 
 adequate controls are needed to ensure a proper balance between financial stability 
and market discipline. National authorities that have not done so should consider 
adopting compensatory measures that are commensurate to the level of coverage in 
order to mitigate the risk of moral hazard. Such measures could include, for example, 
more intensive supervision, the introduction of risk-based premiums, the exclusion of 
certain categories of deposits from coverage (e.g. deposits held by more sophisticated 
depositors such as financial institutions), and timely intervention and resolution by 
deposit insurers or other safety net participants. The IADI and other relevant bodies 
should provide more guidance on the types of instruments and good practices that can 
help mitigate moral hazard (Financial Stability Board, 2012).
 Another consequence of the deposit insurance coverage increase, mentioned 
above, is an increase in the extent of the premium assessment base. The premium 
assessment base is the foundation used to determine the contributions made to the 
deposit insurance fund by member institutions. The most common assessment bases 
are insured, insurable and total deposits.
 Insurable deposits are defined as all deposits in all categories that are insured, 
including amounts in excess of the limit on insurance claims. For example if the 
3. The data for GDP per capita for 2009 and 2010 used for ratios calculation are available at http://
www.finance.gov.mk/files/u9/MKindikatori_Septemvri_2012_3.pdf .
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 insured limit for a demand deposit is USD 50,000 a USD 90,000 deposit would 
be fully counted in insurable deposits, but only USD 50,000 would be included 
in  insured  deposits. Insured deposits are the amount of deposits that are protected 
within the limit of insurance claims. Calculating premiums on the basis of insurable 
 deposits means that premium would be charged on deposits which are not covered. 
Total  deposits would accentuate this issue, since some categories of deposits may not 
be covered at all (IADI, 2009).
 An increase of the deposit insurance coverage limit will have an effect on the 
premium assessment base only in cases when insured deposits are used as a base for 
premium calculation. Where deposit insurance premium is calculated on insurable 
or total deposits, higher deposit insurance coverage will not increase contribution to 
the deposit insurance fund by member institutions i.e. deposit insurance costs of the 
financial institutions will stay the same. 
 The European Commission has estimated the impact on EU banks that the 
 increase in deposit insurance coverage level will have. The estimation scenario  results 
 indicate that the average percentage decrease of banks’ operating profits at EU level 
is 4  percentage points when the level of coverage is set at EUR 100,000 (European 
Commission, 2011). The deposit insurance system of the Republic of Macedonia 
uses insurable deposits as a base for premium calculation, so the increase in deposit 
insurance coverage will have no effect on the banks’ contribution.
 Another consequence of the deposit insurance coverage increase, mentioned 
above, is increase in the potential financial commitment of the deposit insurance 
institution. The  increase in deposit insurance coverage will lead to an increase in 
the amount of  deposits that are covered with insurance. An estimation made by the 
European Commission about the effects of the increase in deposit insurance coverage 
in the EU to EUR 100,000 indicates that it increases the amount of covered deposits 
to 17.5 percent. The average increase for the EU 12 is 48.8 percent, and the average 
increase for the EU 15 is 17.5 percent  (European Commission, 2011).
 The potential financial obligation of the deposit insurance institution for 
 depositors’ reimbursement will rise with the increase in the amount of covered 
 deposits.  Re-evaluation of the adequacy of the deposit insurance fund will be 
 needed, especially in deposit insurance systems where the increase in the amount of 
 covered deposits is significant. Maybe there will be a need for changes in the funding 
 mechanism, including additional sources of funding etc.
 Around 99 percent of the deposits in the Republic of Macedonia were covered 
by insurance before the increase in the deposit insurance coverage (Gosev, 2008). 
Changes in the deposit insurance coverage will lead to an insignificant increase in the 
potential financial obligation of Deposit Insurance Fund Skopje.
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Elimination of co-insurance
With the co-insurance arrangements there is full protection of the depositors up to 
a  certain ceiling, beyond which (excessive) deposits are subject to co-insurance, 
 requiring the depositor to bear part of the cost in case of a banking failure (Schich, 
2008).While there is no co-insurance in the USA, in the EU, the original Directive 
94/19/EC stipulated that the member states may decide that depositors should bear 
a certain percentage of losses themselves in case of a bank failure. According to its 
provision, the member states might limit the coverage level to a specified  percentage 
of deposits, which had to be equal to or exceed 90% of aggregate deposits until the 
amount to be paid under the guarantee reached the minimum coverage limit (i.e. 
EUR 20,000). In other words, the directive allowed for 10% co-insurance, i.e. the EU 
member states which had decided to apply 10% co-insurance had to set the minimum 
coverage limit at EUR 22,222 in order to reach the minimum required level is EUR 
20,000.
 In practice, prior to the outbreak of financial turmoil in 2008, co-insurance was 
applied to deposits of individual customers in 12 countries of the EU – mostly in the 
new member states (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, 
 Poland, Slovakia), but in a few old ones as well (Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Unit-
ed Kingdom). There was mostly coinsurance of 10 percent. In some cases,  deposits 
not exceeding the coverage limit were insured at 90 percent, while in other cases – in 
order to protect small depositors – deposits were insured partly at 100percent and 
partly at 90 percent (e.g. in Poland, it was 100 percent for amounts up to EUR 1,000, 
and 90 percent for amounts between EUR 1,000 and EUR 22,500) (Szelag, 2009).
 The deposit insurance system of the Republic of Macedonia has applied 
 coinsurance of 10 percent till 2010. The deposits with amounts up to EUR 10,000 
were 100 percent covered by insurance, and deposits with amounts between EUR 
10,000 and EUR 20,000 were only 90 percent covered by insurance. With  amendment 
of the Law on the Deposit Insurance Fund of 2010, the coinsurance was excluded.
 The EU has excluded the coinsurance arrangement with Directive 2009/14/EC. 
The coinsurance was excluded in order to strengthen public confidence in the  banking 
system. If people are not convinced that their money deposited in a bank is fully safe, 
they will be more ready to withdraw this money (to prevent it from being lost) at 
the first whispers of bank troubles – even if they are not necessarily true (or they are 
just rumours). And a bank run might involve another bank run, and such a contagion 
 effect could threaten the stability of the entire banking system (Szelag, 2009).
 Two basic problems may appear with the elimination of coinsurance:
1) The elimination of co-insurance may increase the moral hazard problem;
2) The elimination of co-insurance will increase the potential financial commitment 
of the deposit insurance institution.
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 The method of co-insurance aims to reduce moral hazard risk on the part of 
 depositors and banks. If depositors expected full compensation for losses, then they 
too would no longer need to consider the risk associated with the particular banks 
in which they placed their money. This, in turn, would have serious and potentially 
damaging consequences for the whole banking system as it would favor institutions 
which, for example, offered unrealistically high rates of interest, at the expense of 
more prudent ones. And it would encourage managers who wanted to attract deposits 
to adopt riskier strategies.
 Although using co-insurance to encourage consumers to invest their savings in 
healthy institutions was attractive in theory, its effect in practice was not as  expected. 
On the other side, since the crisis, the role of deposit insurance in promoting  financial 
 stability has  taken precedence over concerns about contributing to moral hazard. 
 Therefore  abandoning  co-insurance in order to restore public confidence is  considered 
as necessary and justified.
 The elimination of co-insurance will increase the potential financial  commitment 
of the deposit insurance institution for the amount of costs that was previously borne 
by the depositors in case of a bank failure. Because the co-insurance in the  deposit 
 insurance system of the Republic of Macedonia was 10 percent and it was applied 
only to deposits between EUR 10,000 and EUR 20,000, the potential financial 
 obligation of the deposit  insurance institution will be increased less than 10 percent. 
The average  potential  financial obligation of deposit insurance funds in the EU will 
not be significantly increased due to co-insurance elimination, because co-insurance 
was not applied in each country and it was not higher than 10 percent.
Changes in payout speed
The crisis pointed to the importance of quickly re-assuring depositors about access to 
their funds. Payout delays, particularly in a crisis, created incentives for  preemptive 
runs by depositors. The slowness of payout is one of the major factors which could 
contribute to undermining depositors’ confidence. In reviewing design features of 
deposit insurance systems, many countries have focused on the payout period. It 
was considered that the previously acceptable payout periods were unlikely to be 
sufficient.
 With regard to the speed of payout, there is a substantial difference between the 
US and the EU. In the US, the reimbursement is near immediate, i.e. maximum a few 
days  after a bank/thrift failure; usually, most depositors are reimbursed within 1-2 
 business days after the closure of the failed institution (Szelag, 2009). On the other 
hand, EU  Directive 94/19/EC stipulated that the deposit guarantee schemes in the 
EU –after  making a determination by the competent authorities (within  maximum 
3 weeks) that a given credit institution had failed to repay deposits which were 
due and payable– should have been able to pay duly verified claims by depositors 
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in respect of unavailable deposits within 3 months. In exceptional circumstances, 
a  deposit  guarantee scheme might apply for an extension of the above time limit. 
The  competent authorities might allow for no more than two further extensions of 3 
months each. That means that maximum payout period allowed by  Directive 94/19/
EC was 9 or almost 10 months.
 With the new Directive 2009/14/EC European Commission has made changes in 
the payout period and the new payout period was set according to the following rule: 
5+20+10 working days, i.e. (Szelag, 2009):
● Competent authorities shall make determination at the latest 5 working days after 
first becoming satisfied that a credit institution has failed to repay deposits which 
are due and payable;
● Deposit guarantee schemes shall be in a position to pay duly verified claims by 
depositors in respect of unavailable deposits within 20 working days of the date 
above determination;
● In exceptional circumstances, a deposit guarantee scheme may apply to the 
 competent authorities for an extension of the time limit, which may not exceed 10 
working days.
 The deposit insurance regulation of the Republic of Macedonia, regarding the 
 period for depositors’ reimbursement, fully complied with Directive 94/19/EC, 
and since 2010 has complied with the new Directive 2009/14/EC. There is only 
 exception for the period required for making determination for the activity of the 
credit  institution by the competent authorities.
 Shortening the payout period requires additional reforms in deposit insurance 
 systems. Adequate payout arrangements – such as early information access, robust 
information technology infrastructure, sufficient staff resources or engagement of 
outside agents – have to be put in place to handle depositors’ reimbursement. Changes 
are required in the funding mechanism as well. Secondary funding sources can help 
ensure the deposit insurer meets its funding needs. In contrast, unclear or informal 
standby arrangements that may require additional approval before draw-down could 
jeopardize the speed of handling a depositors’ payout or bank resolution and impede 
the effectiveness of the  deposit insurance system in maintaining financial stability.
 Changes in the deposit insurance system, that a fast payout requires, entail 
 potential  financial costs for banks and consumers. The European Commission has 
made  estimation of those costs, focusing on costs for tagging deposits, data cleansing 
and the creation of Single Customer View (SCV)4. The estimation indicates that the 
costs would  decrease banks’ operating profits in the EU by around 1 percent. From 
the consumers’ point of view, average decrease in the interest rate would be around 
0.02 percentage points  (European Commission, 2011).
4. SCV is defined as a single, consistent view of an eligible claimant’s aggregate protected deposits.
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Conclusion
The role of deposit insurance and the design features of deposit insurance systems 
are undergoing important changes in the aftermath of the 2008/9 global  crisis. 
Changes were made in order to restore public confidence in the banking system, 
stop  widespread bank runs during the crisis and increase the stability of the  financial 
system. In addition to fulfilling the purpose they were introduced for, the changes 
can have other effects as well. This paper endeavors to identify the other  potential 
 effects, to  analyze them and to give recommendations for the purpose of easier 
 system  adjustment and negative effects minimization. For the sake of greater  paper 
 articulacy, effects of every particular change have been identified and analyzed in 
particular previous chapters and this chapter gives a summary of the concluding 
 remarks from the overall analysis. 
 Increase in deposit insurance coverage can initiate moral hazard, increase the 
 premium assessment base and increase the potential financial commitment of the 
deposit insurance institution. Elimination of co-insurance can have the same effects 
as the increasing of deposit insurance coverage apart from the effect on the  premium 
assessment base. Shortening the payout period requires additional reforms in deposit 
insurance systems which will entail potential financial costs for banks and  consumers.
 Since the crisis, the role of deposit insurance in promoting financial stability has 
taken precedence over concerns about contributing to moral hazard. Because the 
 increasing of deposit insurance coverage and elimination of co-insurance play an 
important role in reducing the depositors’ incentive to run, the moral hazard  problem 
should be mitigated with other compensatory measures, such as more intensive 
 supervision, introduction of risk-based premiums, exclusion of certain categories of 
deposits from coverage and  timely intervention and resolution by deposit insurers 
and other safety net participants.
 The deposit insurance premium assessment base will be increased with the  increase 
of deposit insurance coverage in systems where insured deposits are used as  premium 
calculation base. Where deposit insurance premium is calculated on  insurable or 
 total deposits, higher deposit insurance coverage will not increase  contribution to 
the  deposit insurance fund by member institutions i.e. deposit insurance costs of the 
financial institutions will stay the same.
 The potential financial commitment of the deposit insurance institution will rise 
with the increase in the amount of deposits that are covered by insurance and for 
the amount of costs that was previously borne by the depositors in case of a bank 
failure. This will require re-evaluation of the adequacy of the deposit insurance 
fund, especially in deposit insurance systems where the increase in the amount of 
 covered deposits is significant. Maybe there will be a need for changes in the funding 
 mechanism, including additional sources of funding etc.
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Abstract  
The discussion about the effectiveness of active policy measures that consider 
spatial socioeconomic aspects has become especially important in light of recent 
socio-economic developments. The paper presents an alternative methodology for 
the determination of spatial boundaries for any socioeconomic locality, based on 
the gravity models tradition. We apply the described methodology to the Region 
of Central Macedonia and show that there are significant discontinuities between 
administrative spatial  segregation on the one hand and socioeconomic on the 
other. The latter provides evidence for the inappropriateness of simply following 
the administrative boundaries and reveals the usefulness of our proposal.
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1. Introduction
The use of administrative areas as geographical units does not provide a valid insight 
into the functional reality of the territory. Administrative boundaries are not necessarily 
appropriate, either for scientific research or for policy making (Casado-Diaz, 2000). 
Commonly, employment and housing networking does not coincide with existing 
 administrative units. Local district boundaries usually have a historical background that 
does not automatically correspond to current links and relations. The development of 
new transport or social infrastructure or new retail, commercial, industrial, residential 
and leisure facilities continuously redefines the current spatial socioeconomic  structure 
(Duncan, 2010). Moreover, Ballas and Clarke (2000) pointed out that the use of 
 specialized geographic tools increases the efficiency of applied socioeconomic policy. 
Given the recent socio-economic developments within the systemic crisis, the scien-
tific interest in active policy measures with respect to local socioeconomic aspects has 
been amplified. The main purpose of a spatial planning framework is to ensure that 
 policies cover local socioeconomic needs, counteract regional inequalities and favour 
a more balanced regional economic development (Duncan, 2010)1. In other words, it 
is of great importance to develop methodologies that ensure an efficient determination 
of each socioeconomic locality. This is especially the case in planning and applying 
 locally specified, active employment policies. Spatial dimensions contribute a lot 
to the understanding of the labour market and thereby to the development of well 
adjusted measures. 
 The gravity model has been one of the most popular empirical methodologies 
for studying spatial interactions in economics over the last fifty years (Cieślik, 
2009 and Rose, 2000). It imitates Newton’s law of universal gravitation (1687): the 
 socioeconomic mass of two agglomerations (measured for instance by the population 
or by locally produced income) along with their distance determine the magnitude of 
their relations in terms of goods, services and production factors. Gravity models “... 
are simple in structure, fit the data well, and are in principle consistent with a wide 
range of theoretical underpinnings” (Deardorff, 1998) and they provide “some of the 
clearest and most robust findings in empirical economics” (Leamer E. & Levinsohn 
J.,1995). 
 The main purpose of this paper is to present an innovative methodology for the 
determination of spatial boundaries for any socioeconomic locality, based on the gravity 
models tradition. Thereby, we provide an instrument for a more efficient preparation 
of spatially oriented measures (see also in Zarotiadis and Stamboulis, 2011). As an 
1.“In my mind, direct links between the European Union and regional and local authorities are more 
needed than ever” (Martin Schulz - President of the European Parliament, www. 11/03/2013 - 
Reuters.com).
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indicative example, we apply the presented methodology to a specific Greek Region 
and we show that there are significant discontinuities regarding administrative spatial 
segregation on the one hand and the actual socioeconomic segregation on the other. 
 The next section presents the proposed normative algorithm for empirical 
 regionalization. The third section deals with the pilot application in the Region of 
Central Macedonia. We present the results on a map, contrasted with the picture of 
administrative segmentation and we go into the main differences. To conclude, the 
last section summarises the discussion and comments on policy implications.
2. Algorithm for empirical regionalization
The algorithm we present provides the optimal spatial segregation of socioeconomic 
locality (for instance, as we will see in the pilot application, of local labour  markets), 
based on the quantitative consideration of the socioeconomic mass of various 
 agglomerations, the distance, administrative constraints, infrastructure as well as other 
socioeconomic parameters. It proceeds through the following steps:
i) Determine an elementary or augmented log-linear formulation of a gravity model:
 ln(Mobi,j) = ln(b) + a1ln(pi )+a2ln(pj)+ a3ln(distancei,j)+ a4lnF+ εi,j         (1)
where Mobi,j is a measure for the magnitude of the relation between any pair of 
 considered agglomerations (i,j = 1,2,...,N, i≠j and N is the number of considered 
 agglomerations); pi and pj is the significance (the socioeconomic mass) of any 
 agglomeration; distancei,j shows the distance between them; F is a vector of various 
dummy variables representing the different physical, technical and administrative 
boundaries that exist between i and j. (Note that a4 is the vector of relevant coefficients.)
ii) Based on the estimated coefficients b, a1, a2, a3 and a4, calculate the estimated rela-
tion for each pair of considered agglomerations in the region of interest, eMobi,j
2. 
 Construct the double entry matrix A:
2. There is a precondition for this step: the estimated equation has to be significant enough and 
unbiased. Otherwise, the usefulness of eMobi,j can be doubtful. There are no generally valid rules 
for having a significant, unbiased, estimated equation, depending on the type of data and the 
applied econometric model and method.
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iii) Calculate the relative significance, Ri,j     (0,1), of each eMobi,j by dividing it by the 
sum of all eMobi,j. For instance, if we measure Mobi,j by the number of  employees 
that move from one agglomeration to the other (as we do in the pilot application 
we present below), Ri,j represents the relative significance of the estimated mobility 
between i and j, related to the overall mobility in the wider area. 
 Construct the double entry matrix B:
iv) Calculate eRi,j = R.,j  Ri,. 
 eRi,j represents the indicative mobility between the two agglomerations i and j. In 
a way, eRi,j stands for the mobility that would arise only due to the total relative 
repulsion of each departure city (Ri,.) and the total relative attraction of each arrival 
city (R.,j), without having any additional reasons that give rise to an intensified 
dependence of i and j. In other words, we treat the two variables (city of departure, 
city of arrival) as being independent. 
 Construct the double entry matrix C:
v) Construct matrix D = B – C
 If an element (Ri,j - eRi,j) of matrix D is positive (negative), the interaction from 
departure agglomeration i and arrival agglomeration j is (not) gravitational. (The 
closer to one an element is, the more gravitational is the relation.)
From this point on, the following steps are provisional and may be adjusted according 
to the characteristics of the specific study. In general, we should proceed with the most 
appropriate form of clustering analysis. For instance, in the pilot application presented 
in the following section, we first picked out the most intense pairs of agglomerations (the 
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highest Ri,j - eRi,j). Note that at this point of the clustering procedure, we did not consider 
the biggest city of the specific Region (in terms of population). Thereafter, pairs were 
combined into groups by considering the strongest mutual gravitational interactions3. 
Next, we can also proceed with consolidating groups that were characterized by the 
higher number of mutual gravitational interactions. Finally, we include the biggest 
agglomeration (city) of the Region to the group that has the mightiest mean mutual 
gravitational interaction with this city. 
3. A pilot application to the Region of Central Macedonia
The study we present in this part of the paper provides a good example of how we 
can use the described methodology. Moreover it shows what could be the resulting 
differentiations compared to the actual administrative segregation of the region, even 
when we do not use a very detailed analysis of agglomerations, as is the case, for 
reasons of simplicity, in the following. 
 We used data from the Greek Social Data Bank (GSDB) in the National Centre 
of Social Research (EKKE) on the mobility of employees between the municipalities 
(133) of the Region of Central Macedonia. As we mentioned before, for reasons of 
simplicity we restricted our sample to the agglomerations whose population is over 
20,000 inhabitants: Alexandreia Imathias (AI), Aridaia (A), Edessa (E), Giannitsa (G), 
Katerini (Ka), Kilkis (Ki), Naousa (N), Serres (S), Thessaloniki (T) and Veroia (V). 
Additionally, we included also Irakleia Serron (IS), Litohoro (L), Poligiros (P) and 
Nea Moudania (NM) in order to have a more effective representation of the whole 
geographical area. 
 The Pearson-test showed that none of the various conceivable dummy variables (if 
the city is an administrative centre, existence of administrative border, if there is a main 
road connection or not) should be included in the model. Therefore, we formulated 
the following equation:
 ln(Mobi,j) = ln(b) + a1ln(pi )+a2ln(pj)+ a3ln(distancei,j) + εi,j          (2)
OLS regression gave the results presented in the following table4:
Estimated coefficients are significant and confirm the theoretical assumptions: as 
expected pair-wise labour mobility is being positively affected by the size of the two 
cities and negatively by their distance. R2- and F-statistic, as well as the results of the 
regression specification error test, indicate that the model is well specified and provides 
a satisfactory explanatory ability. 
3. As a rule of thumb, at least half of the existing mutual relations had to be gravitational in order 
to allow the combination of two groups. The specific restriction was applied in order to ensure a 
minimum internal consistency.
4. We applied White-correction in order to remove heteroskedasticity. Estimation is free of  multi-
collinearity.
182 Z. SARTZETAKIS, G. ZAROTIADIS, South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics
2 (2013) 177-185
Based on the above estimations, we constructed the four matrices of our methodology, 
following the procedures mentioned above:
Table A.
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Table B.
Table C.
Based on the results of table D, we may proceed with the appropriate form of clustering 
analysis. In order to provide a complete pilot application of the proposed methodology, 
we first picked out the most intense pairs of agglomerations (the highest Ri,j - eRi,j) 
and we combined pairs into groups according to the mutual gravitational interaction. 
We also proceeded with consolidating groups, getting finally a picture which, despite 
the fact that that we restricted our sample to relatively big agglomerations, reveals 
significant differences compared to the current administrative structure. According to 
our estimates the prefecture of Thessaloniki and that of Kilkis should be treated as a 
single labour market. The same is true for Pella and Imathia –in fact they could also 
be included in the socioeconomic area formed around Thessaloniki. The prefectures 
of Serres, Pieria and Chalkidiki can be treated as separate markets. 
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Table D.
4. Conclusions
Administrative boundaries usually have a historical background that does not 
 automatically correspond to current links and relations. Therefore, it is not necessarily 
the appropriate way to determine socioeconomic localities.
 At the same time, the recent systemic crisis and the resulting deficiencies amplify 
the importance of spatially specified, active policies. Locally accustomed planning and 
applications are the most secure way to counteract regional inequalities and to favour 
a more balanced regional economic development. This is especially the case when 
we deal with active employment policies. Spatial dimensions contribute greatly to the 
understanding of the labour market and thereby to the development of well adjusted 
measures. 
 Consequently, it is of great importance to develop methodologies that ensure an 
efficient determination of each socioeconomic locality. This is exactly the contribution 
of the present paper: based on the tradition of the gravity model, we develop an 
innovative algorithm that considers current demographic data, various socioeconomic 
relations, measurable or not, spatial dimension and transport infrastructure, in order 
to provide an objective segregation of local economies and societies. 
 In the second part of the paper we proceed with a pilot application of the developed 
methodology using labour mobility data from the main cities in the region of Central 
Macedonia. Despite the fact that we use a less detailed analysis of agglomerations, 
excluding from our sample those that have less than 20,000 inhabitants, and although 
we lack similar applications that would provide us with a set of comparable estimates 
simplifying the decision upon the clustering analysis, the results of our methodology 
prove the existence of significant discontinuities between the socioeconomic and the 
administrative segregation of the area. This verifies the inappropriateness of simply 
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following the administrative boundaries and reveals the usefulness of our proposal. As 
far as optimal determination of socioeconomic locality is a prerequisite for effective 
planning, the developed methodology could be an important contribution for the 
enhancement of applied policies in the future.
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Abstract  
The current article examines the trade balance of Greece in the Euro era, in 
general, and in particular within the Member States of the Euro Zone (EZ). It was 
found that in the Euro-era, the Greek trade balance has deteriorated in general and 
particularly within the Member States of the EZ, while losses in competitiveness 
of the Greek economy have been observed. The structure of production and 
foreign trade affect the trade deficit and competitiveness of the Greek economy. 
Moreover, the more rapid rates of inflation in Greece, compared with its trading 
partners, led to a revaluation of the real exchange rate in the country, affecting 
its export performance. 
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1. Introduction
According to the European Commission, although the degree of openness has been 
rising over the past 15 years, Greece remains a relatively closed economy. Based on 
the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, trade openness has  increased 
significantly from around 43% of GDP in 1995 to almost 60% in 2008; however it 
still remains relatively low compared with the average of the Euro area as a whole 
(approximately 88% of GDP in 2008). This increase reflects an uneven development 
in exports and imports. It is linked to a strong and stable domestic  demand and a 
steady decline in competitiveness (import penetration increased by 10  percentage 
points, from about 26% of GDP in 1995 to nearly 36% in 2008, while the share of 
 total  exports in GDP increased by approximately 7 percentage points from 17% to 
24% over the same period). The growth of trade is not driven by increased  integration 
of Greece into the Euro Zone. Although the Euro area remains the largest  trading 
 partner of the country, its share in total trade has declined. Trade in goods and  services 
in the Euro area accounted for less than half of total trade in 2008, compared with 
nearly 58% in 1995. The real growth in exports of goods and services exceeded 10% 
on average over the period 1995-2000, it became  temporarily negative in 2001 and 
2002 (-40% on average) before retrieving a positive real growth of over 6 %, on 
average, between 2003 and 2008. Export growth was consistently lower than that of 
imports, mainly from the late 1990's onwards. The market share in exports showed a 
downward trend, falling from 0.22% in 1995 to 0.16% in 2002 and then stagnated at 
around 0.17% (European Commission, 2010, p. 68-73, 143).
   The course of Greece's exports of goods as a percentage of GDP presents the 
 following trend: in 1961, exports of goods were 8%, which is about as much as in 
2004. In 1971, exports fell to 5.7%, in 1981 increased to 19%, whilst they declined to 
11% in 1991 and 7.8% in 2004. The period of intensive growth in exports was that of 
1973-1981, when the exports of goods increased almost ten-fold, showing an  average 
annual growth of 34% in current prices. Until 2004, and while exports of goods show 
a small annual increase, they show a steady decline as a percentage of GDP. This 
downturn was reversed after 2004 showing a strong recovery in 2005, while it is 
estimated that as a percentage of GDP they amounted to 8.8% in 2006,  contributing 
1.04% to the growth of the economy in 2006 (Eurobank, 2008). In 2008 exports 
 accounted for 7.2% of GDP, a figure which ranks Greece second lowest (26th) in the 
EU, followed  by Cyprus (6.3%) (SEVE, 2009, p. 7, 18).
 The trade balance of Greece in the Euro era, is the subject (focus) of this article. 
This article examines the exports, imports and the trade balance of Greece (2000-
2008) in total, with the EU (27) and with third countries, particularly the Member 
States of the Euro Zone (EZ). Quantitative secondary data related to the specific 
time period are registered and analyzed.  This period is selected for the reason that 
Greece joined the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) on 1 January 2001 
G. MAGOULIOS, S. ATHIANOS, South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 2 (2013) 187-216 189
and since 1 January 2002 it has adopted the Euro as its official currency and because 
the  consequences of the economic crisis for the Greek economy had not erupted at 
that time.
 This article investigates the effects of foreign trade within the Member States of 
the Euro Zone, the shares of the Member States in exports, imports and trade balance, 
as well as the deficit, the sectoral composition of foreign trade and some of the fac-
tors affecting the trade balance deficit and the competitiveness of the Greek economy. 
The basic research questions are the following: Has the export performance of the 
country improved since the accession of Greece to the EZ, or not? Has the Greek 
trade balance worsened or not in general and in particular, within the Member States 
of the EZ? Were there any gains or losses in competitiveness for the Greek economy? 
In which degree, does the structure of production and foreign trade, such as inflation 
differentials, have an impact on the deficit in the trade balance and competitiveness 
of the Greek economy?
2. Literature Review 
An examination of the effects of factor productivity on trade indicates that the  argument 
of an open economy that promotes trade, which in turn helps to extend the boundaries 
of productivity, is highly correlated with the leader export  economies. It is found 
that export labour-intensive industries are competitive, therefore the  labour-intensive 
 developing economies should move up the technological ladder,  otherwise the 
 increased competition could undermine their exports. In  developing economies, 
the productivity of labour-intensive industries should be improved as  exports are 
 rising. The opening up of the economy through trade is a prerequisite in order to 
improve  productivity, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for  development. 
 Otherwise, the competitive and comparative advantage of a  labour-intensive export 
economy could be eroded. In industrialized economies, which have achieved a high 
technological level, national policies should focus on improved  productivity and 
technology (Kui-Wai Li, Siegfried Bender, 2007, p. 141-143).  Although as far as 
this process is concerned, progress has been made in the developed countries, of 
Northern Europe, it is proceeding slowly in the countries of the South and especially 
in Greece.
 One of the factors that influence the extent of competition in a market is the 
 relative openness of an economy. The extent of this factor influences the  strengthening 
of  competition and good practice dissemination, while it facilitates technology 
 transfer and the access to knowledge. What’s more, market openness facilitates 
the  identification and the opening of new markets, as well as the increase of prof-
its and the creation of new products. International practice has shown that small 
economies are often strongly linked with the international economic environment 
which is,  however, not observed in the case of Greece. Thus, the Greek economy 
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could be  described as relatively closed in terms of trade. Furthermore, by observing 
the  historical development of specific indicators, a clear upward trend is reported, 
which is particularly strong in the case of imports. The difference between these 
two rates indicates the trade deficit of Greece, which is continuing and expanding 
 (Anastasopoulos G., 2004, p. 57, 59).
 An investigation of the case and whether liberal trade policies promote trade 
 openness, has revealed that the link between different types of trade restrictions 
and openness to trade is weak, not always statistically significant and there is no 
clear  evidence that the removal of trade barriers always leads to the improvement 
of trade  liberalization. The data reveal a variety of experiences. Openness in trade 
is not  uniform, universal or clearly linked to trade liberalization. This means that 
if countries liberalized trade prematurely, it could lead to a lower level of exposure 
and probably to economic disaster. This is why the political liberalization should be 
implemented gradually. Under certain circumstances, trade liberalization can indeed 
lead to the expansion of trade. Moreover, it is noted that liberalization is not the only 
policy option for countries that wish to expand trade. Most countries have developed 
their competitiveness behind protective measures, and then either propelled exports 
or  allowed free trade. This means that there is no single trade policy that will benefit 
all countries operating under different conditions (Turan Subasat, 2008, p. 58-59).
 In another paper, the importance of the variety and quality in intra-European trade 
was investigated along with the role of technological innovation and international 
technological diffusion, excluding the documented role of income and the size of the 
country, whereas the role of geographic distance was examined.  It was found that the 
characteristics of the country are important in explaining the pattern of the variety and 
quality in intra-trade flows. The largest EU countries sell a  higher number of  varieties 
and value in comparison to smaller EU countries, but they sell at a  lower price. 
 Richer countries, which are mostly capital intensive, export  higher  quality  products 
in all  areas. Data on the distance between countries, which are mainly  reflected in 
transport and in the unified European market context, show that distance reduces 
the number of varieties traded within sectors and the overall value of  commercial 
 varieties, but increases the average quality of varieties that are  tradable. The research 
and  development costs tend to increase the variety of  intra-trade. Finally, it appeared 
that technological spillovers are increasing both the variety of intra-Community 
trade and the quality of traded goods. Technological innovation and international 
 technological spillovers are important sources of competitiveness of nations (Jan Van 
Hove, 2010, p. 56-57).
 The investigation of the structures of demand and vertical intra-industry trade 
with special reference to North-South trade showed that a more unequal (equal) 
 income distribution in the South (North) increased the share of vertical intra-industry 
trade, while this result depends on the distribution of income between countries. The 
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 positive effect after changing the method of allocation of income of the share of 
vertical intra-industry trade weakens, when the demand for varieties produced by the 
partner is lacking due to large differences in the average per capita income (Joakim 
Gullstrand, 2006, p. 446-447).
 A study on the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on economic growth and 
trade balances of the ten emerging European economies prior to EU membership, 
noted the importance of structural reforms in emerging economies. It was concluded 
that countries with high growth rates could attract inflows of FDI in their  economies, 
while another impact of FDI inflows is that they have a negative impact on the 
 country's trade balance, and they play a significant role in changing the composition 
of trade in most emerging European countries (Hossein Varamini, Svetlana Kalash, 
2010, p. 18-19).
 Fidrmuc’s (2005, p. 232-233) study on the structure of trade during the acces-
sion and the eastward enlargement of the EU, examined the factors of trade between 
 industrial sectors in the EU15 countries in the OECD. It was found that differences 
in per capita income, which are used as a substitute for financing by the countries, 
determine the structure of trade. The total EU-15 has no significant effect on intra-
industry trade in the EU-15. Thus, the country's size and distance from markets are 
the most important factors determining the intra-industry trade (Jarko Fidrmuc, 2005, 
p. 232-233).
 From an analysis of the spatial externality effects on regional development, based 
on theories of economic geography and endogenous growth (increasing returns to 
scale), in the case of  a group of integrated area (the Euro) and the Mediterranean 
countries for the period 1995-2004, it was pointed out that due to the  significant 
presence of spatial dependence, increasing labour productivity in one country could 
contribute to its neighbours through spatial externalities. Also, the  educational 
level facilitates the absorption capacity of foreign technology and thus, it leads 
to  productivity  increase. The rate of technological gap is negative and shows that 
there are some countries that cannot reach the leader country (Germany), in terms 
of  labour productivity. The external effects (financial and technological externality) 
are increasing returns to scale, implying that the increase in inputs leads to a more 
 proportionate increase in production. Also, externalities are voided geographically 
and thus  encourage inequality of regional development. The diffusion of technol-
ogy from north to south is a source of reducing these inequalities and requires the 
 investment of productive resources in the South (Amina Naceur Sboui, 2010, p. 45).
 The pressure for the internationalization of capital in conjunction with the  specific 
mode of building the EU, create a dissymmetry between negative (removal of all 
measures taken by the Member States restricted the free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital) and positive integration, which has become structural in the last 
40 years. The main institutions of the EU, such as the European Commission and 
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the Court, do work by further promoting negative  integration. They  prohibit state 
 interference and impose penalties for anything that can be  interpreted as  opposed 
to a negative conclusion. The logic of European integration is such that market 
 liberalization has precedence over state intervention. Thus, the negative  integration is 
incorporated by conditions on the daily functioning of the EU, the  positive  integration 
– adoption of measures and creation of institutions of  Europe-wide  regulation 
 -depends on the formation of consensus among multiple stakeholders who are in-
volved in European decision-making. In fact, the negative integration removes power 
from nation states to restore the damage caused by the operation of the market, while 
this loss for the national state is not addressed at the supranational level  (Horafas 
Vangelis, 2009).
 An investigation into the whether national regulations are widespread in 
 intra-community trade indicates that they are behind the border measures that 
 reduce the volume of trade between EU Member States or restrict it completely. 
These  arrangements increase the cost of exports and create strategic advantage to 
 domestic producers, disrupt the internal market and, in short, preclude the  existence 
of a  genuine single market. The benefits of such a single market are not fully 
 recoverable and the EU's external competitiveness is compromised. Liberalization of 
the EU  market  creates benefits but also entails costs. Member States, using national 
 regulations, try to adjust these costs by protecting their producers and defending their 
national  interests as a way to restore the loss of economic sovereignty (Maria Helena 
Guimaraes, 2010, 48-49).
 The internal market in Europe has worked in favour of the interaction between 
development, trade and national economies. The contribution of the single market is 
equal to about 10% of the annual potential growth of EU. Nevertheless, the positive 
influence is weakened together with efforts made, aiming at completing the internal 
market for goods and setting up the internal market for services. In intra-Europe-
an trade, in both processed products and services sectors, there has been a gradual 
 reduction from 2001 and beyond. Another indication of inadequate  integration of 
the single market is severe price fluctuations within the EU, which as far as price 
 convergence is concerned, is far from the levels achieved in the U.S.A.  However, there 
is a number of obstacles to free movement of goods, still hampered by a  patchwork 
of national regulations, which are often applied arbitrarily and in clear violation of 
the principle of mutual recognition, which is the cornerstone of the internal market. 
The cost of not applying the principle of mutual recognition is estimated at about 150 
billion (European Commission, 2004, p. 36-37, 41).
 From the investigation of specialization in the foreign trade and international 
competitiveness of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the EU-12, it is revealed 
that the first three countries have tried to exploit the economic benefits from their 
participation in the EU and to eliminate the short-term economic drawbacks of their 
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 participation in the Common Market, through the Structural Funds. Turkey, on the 
other hand, had to face on its own the negative economic impact because of the 
fact that the country was not allowed the free export of agricultural products in the 
EU, in which it has a comparative advantage. The Greek economy was not fully 
able to  exploit the economic benefits as a member of the single market. Since 1981, 
Greece has failed to alter the structure of exports of labour-intensive sectors to more 
 up-to-date products. On the other hand, mainly Portugal and Spain have significantly 
improved their economic performance since 1986. The results show that the Turk-
ish economy indicates remarkable performance in the export of commodities, it is 
 challenging the economies of Greece and Portugal and it is trying to reach Spain in 
the coming  decades (Bahri Yilmaz, 2008, p. 18).
 A study on the foreign trade of Greece, after joining the EU and particularly 
the commercial developments that occurred during the 1990's, found that Greece 
had  suffered significant loss of competitiveness in those sectors in which it had 
 traditionally a comparative advantage, a fact that is reflected in the trade deficit. Two 
explanations can be given for this development: The first is related to the fact that 
the demand for Greek exports in export markets has high income elasticity,  making 
Greek exports vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations. Especially in the 1990's, two 
 periods of economic slowdown were observed in Europe. This could partially explain 
the perceived  stagnation of Greek exports during this period, in conjunction with 
the  opening of transition economies to foreign trade, namely countries  producing 
highly  competitive products to the Greek ones (for example textiles and  agricultural 
 products), and the conflicts that took place in the Balkans, which  disrupted land 
 transport. The  second  explanation is related  to the fact that Greek exports are 
 particularly  sensitive to  fluctuations in the real exchange rate. In the 1990's, Greece 
aimed at reducing  inflation through an ever closer relationship to the German Mark. 
To the extent that changes in the nominal exchange rate did not fully compensate for 
a declining but still positive inflation differential against the EU average, this policy 
was bound to lead to a real appreciation of the Greek drachma. In fact, the high 
 sensitivity of Greek exports to changes in real exchange rates is itself a reflection of 
the fact that Greek production is still concentrated in low-tech, highly competitive 
areas where increases in relative prices or the emergence of cheaper close substitutes 
(such as those  produced by the transition economies) lead to significant losses in 
market share (Michael G.  Arghyrou, Evelyn Bazina, 2002, p. 17-18).
 An analysis of Greek exports and an estimation of the impact on export  performance 
of the country, caused by EU accession, concluded  that joining the EU not only 
failed to improve the export performance of the country, but also had a slight negative 
effect on Greek exports. As a small open economy with production concentrated on 
low–technology and high-competition areas, the country faces a price elastic demand 
for exports in the long term. The supply of exports is also price elastic and is mainly 
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determined by changes in the capacity of the Greek economy and  export subsidies. 
The elimination of export subsidies had little effect on export prices.  According to 
the relevant literature, one of the main reasons for the  deterioration of Greek export 
 performance after joining the EU, is that export subsidies during the period covered 
were not used for growth and diversification of products or new skills in production. 
These could help the country to create new comparative advantages in its products and 
gain market power in international trade. Instead, export  subsidies alone were used 
to increase the income of exporters. These developments may explain the  problems 
 facing the Greek economy, particularly after the mid-1980s, despite the large amount 
of net funds received by the country from the EU budget  (Koukouritakis Minoas, 
2006, p. 165).
3. The external trade of Greece 2000-2008   
3.1 Exports and imports of Greece 2000-2008
During the period 2000-2008, there was an increase in total Greek exports of 36.25%, 
while exports to the EU (27) increased by 40.79% and to third countries by 28.84%. 
More than 2/3 of exports to the EU were bound for the Euro Zone countries, in which 
exports increased by 1/3. The EU share of Greek exports rose by 61.98% in 2000 to 
64.05% in 2008, while the share of third countries declined from 38.02% to 35.95%, 
respectively. In 2000, Greek exports to Member States EZ accounted for 44.26% of 
total exports and 71.42% of exports to the EU (27), while in 2008 their share in total 
exports decreased by 0.84% (43.42%) and 3.63% (67.79%) in exports to the EU (27) 
(Table1). 
 In 2009, Greece's position in the EU-27 exports remained in the 21st place and 
the classification of the EZ remains 14th overall in 16 countries. The same year, 
Greece and Cyprus display the lowest degrees of openness in the EU-27. In par-
ticular, the contribution of Greek exports to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
country is only 6.1% of GDP, while in 2006 the index shows a progressive decline. 
In  contrast, in European economies such as Belgium, Holland, Hungary, Czech Re-
public,  Slovakia, Slovenia and Ireland, exports contribute over 50% of the GDP. The 
European average openness indicator for 2009 is 29.8%, so it can be inferred that 
the Greek economy has a long way to go to become internationally competitive and 
outward looking, at least in the EU-27 (Eurostat, 2009).
 In 2000, among the 20 major export markets of Greece, there were six Euro Zone 
countries in the following order and based on the value of exports: Germany first 
followed by Italy, France 8th, Spain 11th and Holland and Belgium being in the 
12th and15th place respectively. Similarly, in 2008, there were eight countries in the 
EZ with the following ranking: Italy first, Germany second, Cyprus fourth, eighth 
France, Spain 10th, 13th Netherlands, Slovenia and Belgium 17th, 18th (ELSTAT).
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Table 1. Greek Exports to EU (27), Euro Zone and Third Countries 2000-2008 (mill. 
Euro)
 
Source: Eurostat, * ELSTAT, data processing
The total Greek imports increased and reached 67.36% (2008/2000), imports from 
the EU Member States rose to 41.67% and from third countries to 114.86%. The 
share of EU Member States in Greek imports decreased from 64.90% in 2000 to 
54.94% in 2008, while the share of third countries increased from 35.10% to 45.06%, 
 respectively. Half of the imports come from the Euro area Member States,  representing 
approximately 4/5 of imports from the EU (27) and increased by 44.87% in 2008 
compared with 2000. Imports from Member States of the EZ represent 52.41% of 
total imports in 2000 and 81.70% of imports from the EU (27), while in 2008 their 
share in total imports decreased by 7.04% (45.37%) and the share in total imports 
from the EU (27) was increased by 1.88% (83.58%) (Table 2).
Table 2. Greek Imports from EU (27), Euro Zone and Third Countries 2000-2008 
(mill. Euro)
 Source: Eurostat, * ELSTAT, data processing
All extroversion indicators of the Greek economy fell during the period 2008/2000, 
with the exception of imports of goods which increased slightly. Concerning the 
GDP, total exports show the largest decline in exports of goods, and similarly the 
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total imports, showing the largest decrease in imports of services. The highest 
 decrease  appears in the services imports and exports of goods and services. These 
 developments reflect the deterioration in competitiveness and weaken the position of 
Greece in the international market (Table 3).
Table 3. Indicators of extroversion of the Greek economy (% GDP) (2000, 2008)
 Source: ELSTAT, data processing
Out of 16 countries of the EZ (2008/2000), seven countries increased their share 
in world exports, with the greatest increase being registered by Germany, the 
 Netherlands and Slovakia, while nine countries decreased their share, of which six, 
including Greece, are countries of the South. As a result, in the era of the Euro, the 
countries that have the major benefits are the developed countries of the North, while 
southern countries show losses in international competitiveness (Table 4).
   The intra-industry trade between northern and southern (Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
South Italy) areas is very limited. The northern regions tend to be specialized in the 
production of complex industrial goods and skilled labour and to develop  between 
them the intra-industry trade, while the southern areas tend to be specialized in 
the  intensive natural raw materials and unskilled labour and generally in low-and 
 medium-tech sectors. As European integration develops it acquires certain  structural 
features, which may be important sources of instability. The law of comparative 
 advantage is transformed into its opposite, namely the law of absolute advantage, 
conversion, which, combined with economies of concentration, is leading to the 
 development of strong and possibly self-sustaining production and polarization in 
income distribution between countries and regions ( Mariolis T., 2009).
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Table 4. Share of the EZ countries in world exports, 1990, 2000, 2008  
 
 Source: Unctad stat
3.2 The trade balance of Greece 2000-2008
Throughout the period 2000-2008, the trade balance deficit in Greece was increasing 
(84.18%). The corresponding increase in the deficit is 42.11% in the EU countries, 
despite the increase of their share of exports (2.07%) and the reduction of their share 
of imports (-9.96%) and 167.61% with third countries. The deficit in trade with EU 
countries accounted for 66.48% of the total deficit in 2000 and 51.29% in 2008. The 
9/10 of the deficit of trade with EU countries comes from the EZ and it grew by 
49.59% (2008/2000) (Table 5).
 The data of the external trade of Greece with the EZ (2008-2000),  show  that 
 exports  to the EZ represent approximately 2/5 of total exports, whereas whole   imports 
represent half of the country’s total imports. In the era of the Euro (2008/2000), 
while exports to the EZ rose by about 1/3 and imports by more than 2/5, the deficit 
rose by 50%. Moreover, during the same period, while the countries’ share of the 
EZ in Greek exports in the EU27 fell by over three percentage points and  imports 
 increased by nearly two points, the share of the deficit rose by five points. The  highest 
 degree of variation in the trade deficit by the equivalent of exports and imports shows 
the  difference in value between exported and imported products in Greece and the 
 countries of the EZ and the subsequent deficit of competitiveness of the Greek 
 economy.
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Table 5. Trade balance Greece with EU (27), Euro Zone and Third Countries 2000-
2008 (mill. Euro)
 Source: Eurostat, * ELSTAT, data processing
3.3 The foreign trade of Greece with the Member States of the Euro Zone
Greece's exports to the Euro area Member States rose more than 1/3 from 2000 to 
2007. Increase was marked in the exports to twelve (12) countries, showed a  decline 
of exports to Luxembourg and Malta, and remained stable in the Netherlands. 
 Increase over the average was recorded for exports to Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, 
France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy (Table 6). 
Table 6. Exports of Greece in Euro Zone 2000-2007 (mill. Euro)
 Source: Eurostat, data processing
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 Greece's imports from the Euro zone increased by 2/5 in 2007 compared with 
2000. The number of import countries reached thirteen (13) countries, while there is 
a decline in imports from Malta and Portugal. Imports from Luxembourg, Cyprus, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Belgium, Spain and Ireland increased above the average 
(Table 7).
Table 7. Imports of Greece from Euro Zone 2000-2007 (mill. Euro)
 
 
  Source: Eurostat, data processing
Throughout the period under investigation (2000-2007), the trade balance of Greece 
among the other Euro zone members is negative and amounts to a cumulative 118.7 
billion Euro, while it has a trade surplus with only three countries, Cyprus, Malta 
and Slovenia. Greece's trade with six Euro zone countries, Italy, Germany, France, 
 Holland, Belgium, and Spain, produced 95.28% of the cumulative deficit (113.1 
 billion Euro) (Table 8).
 Between 2000 and 2007, the share of Greek exports increased in eight Euro 
area countries (France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and 
 decreased in the remaining. Similarly, Greece has increased its share of  imports 
in eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Slovenia 
and Slovakia). In 2007, four Euro zone countries represent about ¾ of the deficit, 
both Germany and Italy about ¼ each, while France and the Netherlands together 
represent ¼ (Table 9).
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Table 8. Trade Balance Greece-Euro Zone 2000-2007 (mill. Euro)
 Source: Eurostat, data processing
Table 9. Share of Euro Zone countries to Exports (X), Imports (M) and Trade  Balance 
(X-M) of Greece (2000- 2007).
 Source: Eurostat, data processing
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 The trade deficit of Greece with the countries of the Euro Zone rose by 42.49% 
during the period 2000-2007. Increase of the deficit occurred in trade with eleven (11) 
out of fifteen (15) countries. 9/10, roughly, of the cumulative trade deficit (2000-2007) 
was produced by Greek transactions with five (5) EZ developed  countries  (Germany, 
Italy, France, Holland, Belgium), while half of the total deficit was  produced  only 
from trade with two countries, Germany and Italy. It appears that in the era of the 
Euro, Greece's deficit, like that of other weaker economies, creates surpluses in 
 developed countries, thus enhancing the uneven growth in the Euro area. The trend 
has been reinforced by policies to curtail domestic demand applied to the EZ and 
especially in Germany (Table 10).
Table 10. Change in Trade Balance Greece - Euro Zone 2007/2000 (%) and  percentage 
distribution of the total deficit (%)
 Source: Eurostat, data processing, *( ) deficit
From analyzing the data (Table 11), it can be concluded that Greece is in a more 
 difficult position in comparison to the four major trading partners in the EA in all 
indicators of external trade to GDP, excluding the balance of trade services. In 
 particular, regarding the trade balance in goods to GDP (2008/2000), Greece, while 
noting a decline of approximately three percentage points, holds the first place in 
the deficit, which exceeds 16% of GDP. Germany has more than doubled its trade 
 surplus (change of 143%) and the Netherlands increased its trade surplus by about 
1/3. France has a decline in the trade deficit as far as GDP is concerned, while Italy 
also shows a slight deterioration.
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Table 11. Indicators of Foreign Trade of Greece and the four largest trade partners in 
the Euro Area, (% GDP), (2000, 2008)
 Source: European Commission, 2010
3.4 Factors influencing the trade balance deficit in the Euro era 
3.4.1 The  sectoral composition of foreign trade
Looking at the sectoral composition of Greek Foreign Trade (2008) in relation to four 
(4) countries of the EZ, with the largest amount of trade transactions (Germany, Italy, 
France, Netherlands) and after examining 99 branches with a two-digit code,  it could 
be concluded that: In Greek external trade with Germany, out of the 89 branches, 
73 (82%) are in deficit and 16 (18%) are surplus. In  the case of Italy out of the 86 
branches, 72 (84%) are in deficit and the 14 (16%) are surplus while in France  out of 
the 75 branches, 61 (81%) are in deficit and 14 (19%) surplus. Finally, in the case of 
the  Netherlands out of the 74 branches, 66 (89%) are overdrawn and 8 (11%) surplus. 
   Of the twenty six (26) sectors that have a surplus in at least one of the four  countries, 
three branches are in surplus with all four (4) countries, six are in surplus with the 
three countries, five are in surplus with two, whereas twelve sectors are in surplus 
with one country and approximately half of the branches (46) are in deficit with the 
four countries (Table 12).
 We investigated the Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (RCA) of the 14 
sectors in surplus with at least 2 out of the 4 countries of EA (Germany, France, Italy 
and the Netherlands). 
RCA = Xi / SXi: Mi / SMi 
Where: 
Xi  = exports of goods (with s / n 1-14 in Table 13) in 4 markets 
Mi  = imports of the same sectors in their respective markets, 
SXi  = total exports of each sector in all EU countries and 
SMi  = total imports of the same goods from all EU countries 
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Table 12. Surplus and deficit as branches in foreign trade Greece with Germany, 
Italy, France and Netherlands (2008)
 Source: ELSTAT, data processing
By processing the data, the values of index RCA were yielded, as they are presented 
in table 13; the values of RCA index show the following: none of the 14 branches has 
a comparative advantage over the 4 countries of the Euro zone, with which Greece 
has the largest amount of transactions. A branch (s/n 13) does not have a  comparative 
advantage in any country. Two branches (s/n 3, 8) have a comparative advantage in 
trade over three countries, the first in France, Italy and Holland and the second in 
Germany, France and Italy. Six branches (s/n 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 14) have a  comparative 
advantage in trade over two out of the four countries, the first three with France 
and Italy, and the next three with Germany and Italy. Five branches (s/n 2, 5, 7, 9, 
12) have a comparative advantage in trade over one country only, the first three in 
 Germany, the fourth in Italy and last one in the Netherlands.
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   It appears that of the three branches that are in surplus with the 4 countries  mentioned 
above (s/n 1, 2, 3), only the latter has a comparative advantage in three of them. Of 
the six that are in surplus in three countries (s/n 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9), only one (s/n 8) has 
a comparative advantage in all three countries. Of the five that are in surplus in two 
countries (s/n 10, 11, 12, 13, 14), only three (s/n 10, 11, 14) have a comparative 
 advantage in both countries.
Table 13. Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (2008)
 Source: ELSTAT, data processing
Based on the comparative advantage index uncovered in Greece with the four  largest 
trading partners EZ in seven sectors (one-digit code), it appears that none of the seven 
sectors shows an advantage with four or three countries. Two branches (s/n 1, 2) have 
a comparative advantage in two of the 4 countries, the first with Germany and Italy 
and the second with Germany and the Netherlands. Three branches (s/n 4, 5, 7) have 
a comparative advantage in one country, the first and third with Germany and the 
 second with France. One branch (s/n 6) has a disadvantage in trade with 4  countries. 
It can be concluded that even traditional export industries in Greece are lagging 
 behind in competitiveness in trade at least two of the 4 major trading partners EA, 
while the ascending branch of the chemical and allied products has a  comparative 
 advantage in only 4 countries (Table 14).
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Table 14. Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Greece with 4 major 
trading partners in EZ (2008)
 Source: ELSTAT, data processing
The Revealed Comparative Advantage index (RCA) (exports of goods throughout 
the world) of Greece with the four main trading partners in ZTE shows that Greece 
has a comparative advantage compared with the 4 countries in categories of low, 
middle to low-tech, and at a disadvantage compared with 4 countries, in the dynamic 
range of products of medium to high-tech, high tech and information technology and 
communications (table 15).
Table 15. Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (exports of goods 
throughout the world), 2007
 Source: European Commission, 2010.
It is characteristic that even the agricultural trade balance, which until 1981  (accession 
to the EEC) was in surplus, then became unprofitable. During the period 2005-2008, 
the change in the rural balance deficit was 15.07%, while the overall trade balance 
was 11.59%. This is due to the fact that Greece exports herbal products (primary 
stage), with low added value, while she imports livestock products with high added 
value. The major part of agricultural trade is conducted with EU member countries. 
About 75% of imports from EU countries and 68% of exports are also directed to 
them. The rate of increase of imports from the EU is faster than that from the third 
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countries, a development that leads to continuous increase in the share of imports 
from the EU and to an increasing rural deficit (Chymis A., Reziti J., 2010, p. 41, 42).
 On the sectoral composition of foreign trade of Greece, it has been noted that in 
the era of the Euro, the country's comparative advantages are still mostly  concentrated 
in labour intensive industries, low and intermediate technology, while the country 
still lags behind in dynamic high-tech industries. Even in traditional sectors where 
the country has experience and expertise, it seems to have lost its comparative 
 advantage. This development, in the intensely competitive environment of the EA, 
highlights the weaknesses and structural problems of the country's productive base, 
low  productivity of fixed capital and hindrances to research and technology. Greek 
 production,  despite the country's participation in the group of the most  developed 
economies in the EU and despite the use of almost four Community  Support 
 Frameworks,  continues to show characteristics similar to emerging economies.These 
economies have  stronger comparative advantages, as they have not acquired yet the 
characteristics of  developed countries in terms of production structure and foreign 
trade. This gap and the  incomplete identity of a developed country, exacerbate the 
conditions of foreign trade, resulting in trade deficit.
 The combination of high economic growth, the persistent fiscal imbalances and the 
deterioration of the  competitiveness over the past decade have worsened the external 
balance of the Greek economy, with the current account deficit peaking at 14.75% of 
GDP in 2007, before declining to 13.75% of GDP in 2008 from a  position close to 
balance in the mid 1990's. The widening of the external imbalances  happened mainly 
due to a growing deficit of trade, which reached approximately 17% of GDP in 2008 
(almost 6 percentage points more than that of 1995). In  particular, the  performance 
of merchandise exports has been disappointing over the last decade, while imports 
have grown significantly, driven by high domestic demand.  Regarding the  specificity 
of the product, the share of low technology and labour-intensive  products remains 
 important, though declining. The share of exports with high added value (high 
 technology) has been slightly higher in the last few years, though it still remains 
much lower than in the Euro area (European Commission, 2010, p. 68-73).
 In its report, the IMF analyzes  the constant market shares (CMS) of Greek 
 exports during the period 1992-2005, recognizing the profound transformations 
that have  occurred over the last twenty years in Greek exports, both in terms of 
 (geographical) markets, and in terms of products. This analysis seeks to allocate the 
trade flows between the three different outcomes: a) results of world trade (world 
trade  effects), ie changes due to the overall growth of international trade,  b)  allocation 
of  markets  (market distribution effects), ie. effects due to geographic specializa-
tion of a  country in specific markets and c) results of the composition of exports 
 (commodity  composition effects), namely the effects due to the specialization of a 
country in  specific sectors / categories. The difference between these results and the 
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overall change in exports is attributed to the changes in export competitiveness of 
the  country, either positive (when the balance is positive) or negative. For the period 
2000-2005, the IMF  analysis found that 80-90% of export growth in the country is 
due to the  effects of world trade, namely that the observed increase in Greek exports 
is  mainly due to the total increase of the volume of international trade. The geograph-
ical  location of Greece and its access to the rapidly growing markets of the Balkans, 
also leads to a positive result because of the geographical distribution of markets, 
which  represents 35-40%, approximately, of the export growth. On the negative side, 
however, the specificity of the products had a negative impact on the country's ex-
ports, leading to a drop of 15%. The remaining (negative) percentage is attributed 
to a loss of competitiveness. In this way the IMF report confirms that the export 
performance of the country mainly depends on demand, coupled with the  recovery of 
the global economy rather than improving the competitiveness of the Greek economy 
(IMF, 2007).
3.4.2 Differences in Inflation between Greece and Euro Zone
The trade deficit, apart from the composition of foreign trade and the structural weak-
nesses of the economy, is due to the inflation differential between Greece and the 
Euro Zone. During the period 2001-2008 the average annual inflation rate in Greece 
was highest at 0.9 to 1.4% of inflation in the Euro area (Table 16). 
Table 16. Greece Euro-Zone Inflation (HICP) 2001-2008
 Source: Bank of Greece Governor's Report 2009 
Specifically, with regard to inflation, after entering the Euro Zone, Greece recorded 
an inflation rate, which consistently exceeds the average of that of other Member 
States. This is mainly due to: a) Factors associated with differences in the rate of 
increase in production costs of products. Characteristically, in Greece, the average 
annual growth (2001-2006) in per capita nominal wage of employees was 6.40% and 
the  labour cost per unit 3.16%. The corresponding rates in Germany were 1.53% 
and 0.00%, in France 2.88% and 1.95%, in Ireland 5.73% and 3.65% and in  Sweden 
3.57% and 1.54%).  b)  Differences in the rate of growth of domestic demand  between 
Greece and other countries of the EZ. The combination of low interest rates, the 
lifting of credit restrictions and increases in bank liquidity, boosted overall demand 
in the economy and fuelled inflationary pressures. c) The introduction of the Euro 
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(2002), is estimated to have contributed to an increase in inflation of 0.5%. d) The 
distortion of competition in Greece, the existence of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
markets, enabling companies to increase product prices (Anastasatos T., 2008, p. 26, 
Alpha Bank, 2007, p. 40-41, 47).
3.4.3. The real exchange rate in Greece in the Euro era
As shown in Table 17, Greece has had a large loss of competitiveness, which 
 cumulatively for the period 2001-2009, amounted to 18.6% based on the CPI and 
to 26.6% on labour costs per unit of product of the total economy. The growth rates 
of prices and wages in Greece remained consistently higher than the corresponding 
Euro area, resulting in substantial appreciation of the real effective exchange rate 
(based on external trade of Greece with 28 major trading partners). This development 
has exacerbated the level of competitiveness of Greek manufacturing and its ability 
to respond to changes in domestic and external demand (Bank of Greece, 2009, p. 
143, 157). 
 But the claim that the Greek economy has deteriorated because of wage increases 
is questionable. It is argued that the requirements for employees in Greece have been 
increased by approximately the same rate as the average of competitor countries and 
that the Euro is solely responsible for the deterioration of price competitiveness. It 
is reported that the productivity of labour in Greece (1995-2009) had converged to 
the average EU-15 more closely than the purchasing power of the average wage had 
converged. While the convergence of productivity had risen to about 18 percentage 
points, the real average earnings per worker had risen to about 14 percentage points. 
Moreover, it is noted that the unit labour costs in manufacturing industry (involved 
with a large weight to foreign trade) declined (by 100 in 1999) to 94.5  in 2009 versus 
the Euro and 94.4 to the European Union of 27 (INE, 2010, p. 172, 177).
 According to the European Commission, all the four indicators of the real 
 effective exchange rate (based on: the GDP deflator, private consumption, export 
price and unit costs throughout the economy) had an appreciating trend against the 
corresponding indices for 35 industrial Members since 2000. Between 2000 and 
2008, the  appreciation is around 16% on the price deflator for exports and 13% 
based on the GDP deflator. The persistently high inflation seems to be mainly the 
result of  non-competitive behaviour and rigidities in product and labour markets. The 
 appreciation of the cost per unit is based on the real effective exchange rate for the 
whole economy (over 14% in 2008 to 2000, compared to 35 industrial countries), 
resulting in much higher wage increases than in the Euro and the 35 industrialized 
countries, despite rapidly rising productivity, which exceeded that of the Euro area. 
The persistently higher inflation and the loss of competitiveness may also be related 
to imperfections in the functioning of product markets, as evidenced by the rapidly 
developing increases. In sum, most estimates of equilibrium exchange rates suggest 
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that the real effective exchange rate in Greece is overvalued in relation to long-term 
equilibrium (European Commission, 1/2010, p. 68-73).
Table 17. Indices of nominal and real Effective Exchange Rate (EER) of Greece, 
2001-2009
 Source: Bank of Greece Governor's Report 2009, p. 152, * the whole economy
In the annual report on the competitiveness of the Greek economy (2007), it is  noted 
that despite strong growth and healthy rates of productivity growth over the last 
 decade, the Greek economy is experiencing an important extension of the  current 
 account deficit. Many domestic demand factors that contributed to the growth trend 
of the economy, contributed both to charging the external balance and the  formation 
of a significant lack of competitiveness (low interest rates, direct benefits from 
 financial liberalization, investment in Olympic Games). The same report, citing the 
IMF report (2007) records a significant appreciation of the Greek real exchange 
rate, after  entering the Euro Zone. It is estimated that while the actual rate ranged 
Greece, roughly in equilibrium levels at the time of entry into the EMU, it has since 
 diverged from this and at early 2006 it was overvalued by 18% compared to the level 
 justified by fundamentals. The more rapid rates of inflation in Greece, compared with 
its  trading partners, led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate in the  country. 
 Moreover, the IMF considers as the main factors responsible for the significant real 
currency appreciation and increasing the deficit, the following: a) the boom in lending 
that followed the financial liberalization and the decline in real interest rates which 
occurred from late 1990 and b) the fiscal expansion that followed the country's entry 
into EMU (Ministry of Development, 2007, p. 191-193 and IMF, 2007).
   The participation in monetary union potentially brings benefits and costs, both 
short-term, and long term. Important benefits are the stabilization of inflation, lower 
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interest rates, easier financing of public and external debt, the elimination of  exchange 
risk on trade with other member states of the Euro Zone, and the consequent boost in 
intra-European trade; and as a result the stabilization  of the   expectations about the 
course of the exchange rate against other currencies. The price of this stability is the 
denial of policy tools that could be used to offset macroeconomic shocks. Monetary 
and exchange rate policy is now designed not on the basis of national circumstances, 
but according to pan-European needs. Thus, as depreciation against the other part-
ners is not feasible, inflation differentials are accumulated and translated into real 
currency revaluation, thereby affecting the competitiveness of the economy (Tasos 
Anastasatos, 2008, p. 1-3, 26-27).
 Moreover, the lack of the EMU completion - monetary union without a common 
economic policy, non-optimal currency area-, the restrictive policies which apply to 
domestic demand in most developed countries of EA and particularly in  Germany and 
the differences in tax rates affect negatively foreign trade in the Euro Zone,  operate 
against the weaker economies in the South and in favour of the  developed  economies 
of the North. The result of this is that trade deficits accumulate in the southern 
 countries like Greece, which are surplus to the powerful and  dynamic  economies of 
the North. Therefore, the functioning of EMU as an incomplete  monetary  integration, 
has contributed so far in bringing the economies of member countries up, but it 
works, through its foreign trade as a mechanism to transfer wealth from poorer to 
richer leader countries and reinforces the uneven growth of powerful economies in 
favour of the strong and against the weak. Without mechanisms for redressing these 
imbalances, government deficits and trade deficits increase, resulting in the so-called 
twin deficits to inflate the debts of poorer nations.
4. Regression model to measure the degree of influence of the variables on the 
trade balance
4.1 Data and Methodology
Part of the data used in this analysis, constitute the body of the development of the 
model. In particular, the data refers to the trade balance, exports, imports, and the share 
of Euro Zone countries in exports and imports, inflation as well as the  estimated Re-
vealed Comparative Advantage index (RCA). The examined period spans from 2000 
to 2007. Therefore the methodology used the above variables which  identify the trade 
balance, incorporating any effects on formation of the balance. This  methodology 
includes information and determinants which are depicted in the model as follows:
 
Where ΤΒt the trade balance of Greece, IMPit the imports, ΕΧΡit the exports, Χit the 
share of Euro Zone countries to exports, Μit the share of Euro Zone countries to 
 imports, Ιit the inflation and RCAit the Revealed Comparative Advantage index (of 14 
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sectors with overcapacity at least by 2 of the 4 countries of ZTE - Germany, France, 
Italy and the Netherlands), under the formation of dichotomous dummy  variable. 
 Finally, where εit is the white noise error. When using the deterministic variables in 
the above model, logarithmic values were used to avoid any econometric  problems 
(heteroscedasticity), although using prices rather logarithms gives us a more 
 economically rational response (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995: 157).  Regarding the 
dichotomous dummy variable (slope dummy) of the model, it takes the value 0 when 
Greece has a comparative advantage over another country of the Euro zone, and 1 
otherwise. However, the existence of SOMETHING MISSING HERE, slope dummy 
differentiates the determination of variables in the model, transforming the model as 
follows:
  
The implementation of the model was based on panel data analysis, considering it as 
the most appropriate for cross-sections controls. In addition, we tested the  variables 
of the model on two levels. At the first level of analysis, we tested the degree of 
 impact on the trade balance, by using only the variables of exports, imports, inflation 
and comparative advantage. In contrast, in the second level we did not count imports 
and exports, but the share of Euro zone countries in exports and imports. Finally, the 
model was examined in both variable and fixed periods and cross-section controls, 
giving differing results, especially for inflation.     
4.2 Results Analysis of the Model
The test results of the model are described in the following tables. In particular, we 
note that in the case of vagueness of the period and cross-section control the results 
appear to be in line with the theory, as well as the results of the first level of analysis 
of the present paper (section 3.4) while all variables are statistically significant (ΙΜΡ, 
ΕΧΡ p<1%, RCA p<10%) except the inflation (table 18). Moreover, the explanatory 
power of the model equals to AdjR2= 95.21% as well as AC (Akaike Criterion) = 
1.1976. Finally, we observe a negative impact of imports and a positive impact of 
exports on the trade balance. In contrast, while selecting fixed periods we observe 
that inflation is statistically significant at the level of p<10%, with AdjR2= 97.42% 
and AC (Akaike Criterion) = 0.7315 (table 18).
 Regarding the second level of control (using of shares of imports and exports 
 rather than imports and exports), we find similar results to those of the first level of 
 analysis. In particular, during the vagueness (of the dummy variable) all  variables, 
except inflation, are statistically significant (ΙΜΡ, ΕΧΡ, RCA p<1%), while the 
 explanatory power of the model equals to AdjR2= 94,35% and AC (Akaike Criterion) 
equals to 1.3639. At the same level we observe the results while selecting  certain 
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periods,  inflation appears to be significantly enhanced over the previous analysis 
level. Specifically, all variables are statistically significant for p<1%, except inflation 
where it is p<10% (table 19). Moreover the explanatory power of the model equals to 
AdjR2= 98,08% while AC (Akaike Criterion) equals to 0,7484.
Table 18. The model only with imports and exports
*** significance level  1%
  ** significance level  5%        
    * significance level  10%
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Table 19. The model only with shares of Euro Zone countries to exports and imports 
*** significance level  1%
  ** significance level  5%        
    * significance level  10%
Overall we observe that the test results of the model are in accordance with theory, 
confirming a negative impact of imports on the trade balance, as opposed to exports. 
Furthermore, the Revealed Comparative Advantage index (RCA), has a negative 
 effect and appears to play a key role in shaping of the level of the trade balance, as we 
observe that it affects all variables at statistically significant levels. Finally, inflation 
is statistically significant on the first level of analysis and strengthens the significance 
of the second level of analysis, when we choose specific periods.
Conclusions 
Regarding the export performance of Greece in the Euro area, based on the results 
of the external trade of Greece with EA (2008-2000), it can be concluded that while 
exports to the EZ rose by about 1/3 and imports over 2/5, the deficit rose by 50%. 
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Throughout the period under investigation, the trade balance of Greece  compared to 
the other Euro Zone members was negative and increasing. Greece's trade  transactions 
with five countries in the Euro Zone, namely Italy, Germany, France, Holland and 
Belgium, produced about 9/10 of the cumulative deficit. 
 In the Euro era, the Greek economy has reported losses, since the outward  indicators 
of the Greek economy fell during the period 2008/2000 with the exception of imports 
of goods which increased slightly. As for GDP, total exports fell and the highest 
decrease was noted in export goods. These developments reflect the  deterioration 
of competitiveness and weaken the position of Greece in the international market. 
Moreover, out of 16 EZ countries (2008/2000), only the developed northern countries 
increased their share in world exports, while the southern ones, including Greece, 
decreased their share especially in southern countries. Subsequently, in the era of the 
Euro and at a global level, mainly the developed countries of the north have a benefit, 
while the southern countries  have losses in international competitiveness.
 The structure of production and foreign trade affect the trade balance deficit 
and competitiveness of the Greek economy. As shown by the Index of Revealed 
 Comparative Advantage (RCA) (exports of goods throughout the world) of Greece 
and the four main trading partners in the EZ, Greece has a comparative advantage in 
the categories of low, middle to low range technology, while it has a disadvantage 
in the dynamic range of products of medium to high-tech, high tech and information 
technology and communications.
 This development, in the intensely competitive environment of the EZ, high-
lights the weaknesses and structural problems of the country's productive base, low 
 productivity of fixed capital and the lag in research and technology. Greek  production, 
despite the country's participation in the group of most developed  economies in the 
EU and despite the use of almost four Community Support Frameworks,  continues 
to show features of an emerging economy, where they have stronger  comparative 
 advantages, while it does not have features of a developed country in terms of 
 production structure and ?? foreign trade. This gap and the incomplete identity of 
a developed country, exacerbate the conditions of foreign trade, thus producing the 
trade deficit.
 The lack of competitiveness, apart from the structural weaknesses of the sectoral 
composition of foreign trade, is due to the inflation differential between Greece and 
the EZ. The faster rates of inflation in Greece, compared with its trading partners, 
led to a revaluation of the real exchange rate in the country. Given that the  monetary 
and exchange rate policy is not any longer designed according to the needs of the 
Euro and depreciation against other partners is not feasible, the inflation  differentials 
 accumulate and translate into real currency revaluation, thereby affecting the 
 competitiveness of the economy.
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 Therefore, the functioning of EMU, as an incomplete monetary integration, has 
contributed so far to bringing the economies of member countries up, but it also 
operates, through its foreign trade, as a mechanism of wealth transfer from poorer to 
richer leader countries and reinforces the uneven growth in favour of the  powerful 
economies against the weaker ones. Without mechanisms to restore these imbalances, 
government deficits are added to trade deficits, resulting in the so-called twin deficits 
that inflate the debts of poorer nations.
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Book Review
The book focuses on the interpretation of the legal aspects of European Economic 
Integration regarding the creation of the single market. It does not tackle issues of 
the single currency or fiscal alignment but sheds light on what is the heart of the EU 
structure: the single internal market. Isidora Maletic’s book would be interesting for 
lawyers interpreting the treaty on the creation of the single market and for economists 
who would like to understand the legal aspects of the creation of the single market.
 The book attempts to address, successfully, many legal questions that were still 
open concerning the interpretation of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, which is the principal Treaty on European market building 
through harmonization. It provides also interpretations of Article 114 regarding 
provisions that allow Member States, to protect certain major interests, not national, 
but rather of general importance e.g. the protection of the public health and the 
protection of the environment.
 The book takes the view that market harmonisation is attained through ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ integration, the former being the adaptation of measures by the 
legislation of the Member States in alignment with European legislation in order 
to promote market harmonization, while the latter refers to the deregulatory effects 
on the Member State laws imposed by the European judiciary in order to abolish 
measures that inhibit the functioning of the Single Market. Several examples of both 
aspects of the integration process are presented with particular attention paid to the 
interpretation of the cases of negative harmonization; the role of the Member States, 
the Commission, the Legislature and that of the Courts is analysed and presented.
 It is an essential book for everyone seeking to understand the process of market 
harmonization of the European Union. Potential readers are students, academics, 
judges, government representatives, policy-makers, European Union officials and 
anyone generally interested in the dynamics of EU market harmonisation.

Energy Management in Business
The Manager’s Guide to Maximizing and Sustaining Energy Reduction
edited by Kit Oung
Published by Gower Publishing Limited, UK, 2013 pp. 248
reviewed by Eleni Sfakianaki*
* Assistant Professor, Hellenic Open University, Greece
Book Review
The book deals with the popular topic of energy management. This is an  interesting 
and important topic since we tend to take energy for granted, although there are  certain 
limitations to the resources that energy is produced from: our environment. Being 
successful in reducing energy consumption is part of being sustainable.  However 
energy reduction and energy saving are not simply savings in fuel bills.
 Issues such as energy costs and energy efficiency and the need for energy 
 reductions are thoroughly examined in the first part of the book with proposals on 
how to achieve energy reductions and how to overcome obstacles to  increasing 
 energy  efficiency. Moving beyond a cost-cutting approach to maximize value and 
 profitability requires changes in the traditional philosophy of any business.  Although 
the benefits of lower energy consumption are very tempting (for example lower  energy 
costs, tax  avoidances, improved CO2 footprints and overall better  promotion and 
competitiveness) it seems that business practices are not there yet. The  philosophy 
of energy management is not yet part of the everyday business activities on both the 
employee and the more operational and technical levels. A change in the mindset of 
both senior management and employees is required. 
 A detailed examination of the various tools and techniques used by consultants 
and contractors for assessing and recommending energy reductions is presented in the 
second part of the book. It is undisputed that technology has offered a great deal and 
indeed has assisted in the improvement of several methodologies. It is evident that 
there are now even more advanced devices and techniques that can help to  control 
energy costs and increase energy efficiency but this is not enough. The emphasis 
must be placed on the people that will use the devices, will apply the techniques 
and  monitor the results and will adopt the overall philosophy of energy savings. 
 Otherwise all efforts will only reduce the problem but never optimize the solutions. It 
is, again, people that will detect the next limitation and will try to solve it with a new 
combination of detectors etc. 
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 The third part of the book examines how to gain quick results by understanding 
failures and presenting the maintenance cycle in order to avoid common mistakes. 
These improvements require small or no capital costs and can be implemented with 
no delays. How to choose the right consultant in order to help the business achieve its 
targets is also demonstrated, although it is emphasized that what could work for one 
business environment is not necessarily the best choice for another. 
 Towards the last part of the book the importance of the commitment of the  senior 
management towards energy management is emphasized. Making the results of 
an energy reduction program last requires a management system that changes the 
mentality of the employees but also the everyday practices on the manufacturing/
operational level. In this respect the management systems and how they should be 
implemented to ensure long-term energy reduction are examined. More specifically 
ISO 50001, the new energy management systems standard, is presented, which aims 
at long-term sustainable energy performance improvement. This ISO is based on 
the principle of continuous improvement also used in other standards such as ISO 
9001 or ISO 14001. The book however notes that any energy management system 
should involve the whole company and be integrated into daily operations to ensure 
 sustainable energy reductions. 
 This book is a very useful contribution providing an overview of the reality in 
the business environment today. Several surveys demonstrate that towards the end 
of 2010, the majority of respondents had not started to reduce the energy consumed 
in their business but expect some form of regulation to enforce energy reduction. 
Within this context the book is an important contribution to analyzing techniques 
and  methodologies available, how to gain quick results by improving everyday 
practices, and provides useful information on how to select the right technique and 
the right  consultant. It also offers great help by providing a number of case studies, 
 sometimes a bit too technical, but useful to the manager and even more so to the 
 engineer  involved in this area. Anyone with an interest in the energy sector will be 
able to follow and understand the basic principles presented in the book. 
 In this respect the book certainly provides a framework for thought and 
 implementation. It satisfies its initial purpose of introducing and analyzing the topics 
of energy management and present energy reduction opportunities in the business 
context. It is therefore an excellent source for practitioners, academics, students and 
anyone in general who wishes to gain a deeper understanding of energy management 
and the benefits/risks that businesses face. 
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General information
We welcome submissions addressing the ASECU 2014 International Conference 
theme:
Alternative Economic Policies And Institutional Reforms in 
South And Eastern Europe Towards Post-Crisis Prosperity
The conference objectives are:
§  Analyzing alternative economic policies meant to stimulate post-crisis prosperity; 
§ Assessing the existing institutional reforms in South and Eastern Europe and 
proposing ways for improvement;
§  Debating the alternative models of economic growth and development particular 
to emerging economies;
§  Determining the main challenges for the financial sector and searching for ways 
to overcome them;
§  Establishing mechanisms to support small and medium sized entities and enhance 
their role within the economy;
§  Analyzing the role of the financial reporting process in the post-crisis recovery 
process;
§ Assessing the particularities of the post-crisis business environment in South 
and Eastern Europe;
§  Searching for new business opportunities while aiming for sustainable 
 development.
Accepted papers will be published in the conference proceedings only after their 
presentation in the Conference.
The Editorial Board of South Eastern Europe Journal of Economics (SEEJE), 
the official journal of ASECU, after having the agreement of the authors, plans to 
publish selected conference papers following a blind refereeing process. 
The conference official language is English.
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Conference Topics
§ Economic policies meant to stimulate post-crisis prosperity;
§ Institutional reforms in South and Eastern Europe;
§ Particularities of the post-crisis business environment;
§ Means of promoting sustainable development.
Conference Program Committee
§ Prof. Dumitru Matiş,
 Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
 Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania
§ Associate Prof. Alexandra Mutiu,
 Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
 Babeș-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania
§ Prof. Yannis Tsekouras,
 President of ASECU
 University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece
Important Dates
November 15th, 2013  Deadline for submission of abstracts;
December 15th, 2013  Notification for abstracts acceptance;
February 15th, 2014  Deadline for submission of full papers
    and application forms;
March 31st, 2014  Announcement of the detailed
    conference program 
    (at www.econ.ubbcluj.ro/asecu2014) 
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Guidelines for Submission
(All submissions are refereed):
Submissions of abstracts have to meet the following criteria:
§ Abstracts, written in English, should contain two pages;
§ The title page must include names, affiliations, complete addresses (mail,  e-mail, 
telephone, facsimile numbers) for all authors;
§ The second page should include the name(s) of author(s), title and abstract of 
not less than 300 and not more than 500 words, up to 6 key words and JEL 
classification.
§ Abstracts should be written in letter quality type Times New Roman, font 10, 
line spacing single, top 5 cm, bottom 5 cm, left 4.4 cm, right 4.2 cm, gutter 0 cm, 
header 4 cm, footer 4 cm. Between paragraphs one line space; paragraph justify.
Submissions must not have been published, submitted or presented at other 
 conferences.
Guidelines for Full-paper Submission
§ The full-paper should be of maximum length of 5,000 characters  (including 
list of references), which is typed according to these instructions: (10 pt). 
 Requirements for the paper-formatting: Use A4 Format (297x210 mm); 
 margins: top 5 cm; bottom 5 cm; left 4.4 cm; right 4.2 cm; gutter 0 cm; header 
4 cm; footer 4 cm. Between paragraphs one line space; paragraph justify. The 
text should be written in Word 2003 or in Word 2007 (Windows), Times New 
Roman, font 12.
§ The name(s) of the presenting author(s) and other co-author(s), affiliation(s), 
complete mailing address(es), telephone/fax numbers and e-mail address(es), 
title of the papers should be filled in the Application Form.
§ Special scheduling requests (dates or times) must be made at time of paper 
submission.
§ Electronic submissions are expected. Submissions should be in Microsoft Word 
format. When submitting your paper please write in the subject line: ASECU 
conf. (name of the leading author).
§ Papers with positive judgment of the referees and presented on the conference 
are going to be published in the conference proceedings. 
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Submissions should be sent to the Organizing Committee,
Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration – 
Cluj Napoca
58-60, Teodor Mihali Street
400591 Cluj Napoca
Romania 
e-mail: asecu2014@econ.ubbcluj.ro
Tel: +40.264 41 86 52/3/4/5
Fax: +40.264 41 25 70
Participants who need any assistance should contact:
Associate Prof. Alexandra Mutiu,
Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
Cluj Napoca, Romania
e-mail: alexandra.mutiu@econ.ubbcluj.ro, alexandra.mutiu@yahoo.com
Conference Fee and hotel Accommodation
The conference fee is 50 € for all participants.
Each participant should cover travel costs to and from Cluj Napoca, and should 
directly book  accommodation in Cluj Napoca. The following hotels are recom-
mended by the Organizing Committee:
The following hotels are proposed from the Organizing Committee:
§ We also suggest a list of hotels close to conference venue:
  Hotel Confort***
  Hotel Topaz ***
  Hotel Univers T ***
  Hotel Vila Rao ***
§ We also suggest a list of hotels with high standards:
  Belvedere Hotel ****
  Hotel Onix ****
  City Plaza Hotel ****
  Opera Plaza Hotel *****
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guidefor authors
The articles should be written as follows:
(1) Papers must be in English.
(2) Papers for publication (two copies) should be sent to:
Mrs. Melina Petromelidou
Editorial Secretary 
South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 
ASECU, University of Macedonia, 156, Egnatia Str., 540 06 Thessaloniki, Greece
The Journal’s phone number is (+30) 2310891793, fax: (+30) 2310891748
e-mail: asecu@uom.gr
Submission of a paper will be held to imply that it contains original unpublished work and is 
not being submitted for publication elsewhere. The Editor does not accept responsibility for 
damage or loss of papers submitted. Upon acceptance of an article, author(s) will be asked to 
transfer copyright of the article to the publisher. This transfer will ensure the widest possible 
dissemination of information. 
(3) Papers will be considered in any form, but authors of papers accepted for publication will 
be expected to provide a final copy conforming to the general style of the Journal as outlined 
in notes 4 through 13 below.
(4) Manuscripts should be 1,5 spaced, with wide margins, and printed on one side of the 
paper only. All pages should be numbered in sequence. Titles and subtitles should be short. 
References, tables, and captions for the figures should be printed on separate pages.
(5) The first page of the manuscript should contain the following information: (i) the title; (ii) 
the name(s) and institutional affiliation(s) of the author(s); (iii) an abstract of not more than 
100 words. A footnote on the same sheet should give the name, address, and telephone and fax 
numbers of the corresponding author [as well as an e-mail address].
(6) The first page of the manuscript should also contain at least one classification code 
according to the Classification System for Journal Articles as used by the Journal of Economic 
Literature; in addition, up to five key words should be supplied. 
The classification system used in JEL can be found at:
http://www.aeaweb.org/journals/jel_class_system.html.
(7) Acknowledgements and information on grants received can be given in a first footnote, 
which should not be included in the consecutive numbering of footnotes.
(8) Footnotes should be kept to a minimum and numbered consecutively throughout the text 
with superscript Arabic numerals. 
(9) Displayed formulae should be numbered consecutively throughout the manuscript as (1), 
(2), etc. against the right-hand margin of the page. In cases where the derivation of formulae 
has been abbreviated, it is of great help to the referees if the full derivation can be presented 
on a separate sheet (not to be published).
(10) References to publications should be as follows: ‘Smith (1992) reported that...’  or  ‘This 
problem has been studied previously (e.g., Smith et al., 1969)’. The author should make sure 
that there is a strict one-to-one correspondence between the names and years in the text and 
those on the list. The list of references should appear at the end of the main text (after any 
appendices, but before tables and captions for figures). It should be double spaced and listed 
in alphabetical order by author’s name. References should appear as follows: 
For monographs
Sen, A., 1970, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: Holden Day.
For contributions to collective works 
Kornai, J., 1991, Stabilization and Economic Transition in Hungary: The Next Two Years, in 
J. de Melo and A. Sapir (eds.), Trade Theory and Economic Reform: North, South and East, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 307-326.
For periodicals
Magdalinos, M., 1990, “The Classical Principles of Testing Using Instrumental Variables 
Estimates”, Journal of Econometrics, 44, 241-279. 
Note that journal titles should not be abbreviated. 
(11) Illustrations will be reproduced photographically from originals supplied by the author; 
they will not be redrawn by the publisher. Please provide all illustrations in quadruplicate (one 
high-contrast original and three photocopies). Care should be taken that lettering and symbols 
are of a comparable size. The illustrations should not be inserted in the text, and should be 
marked on the back with figure number, title of paper, and author’s name. All graphs and 
diagrams should be referred to as figures, and should be numbered consecutively in the text 
in Arabic numerals. Illustration for papers submitted as electronic manuscripts should be in 
traditional form. 
(12) Tables should be numbered consecutively in the text in Arabic numerals and printed on 
separate sheets.
(13) Accepted papers should be submitted in electronic form in a storage media (i.e. CD, 
DVD, USB, etc.) with accompanying manuscript. Electronic manuscripts have the advantage 
that there is no need for re-setting of text, thereby avoiding the possibility of introducing errors 
and resulting in reliable and fast delivery of proofs. The preferred format is either .doc or 
.docx. Make absolutely sure that the file on the disk and the printout are identical.
(14) Page proofs will be sent to the corresponding author. Proofs should be corrected carefully; 
the responsibility for detecting errors lies with the author. Corrections should be restricted to 
instances in which the proof is at variance with the manuscript. There are neither submission 
fees nor page charges.
